2025: Battles and numbers

2026: the battle for the south. The Kramatorsk/Sloviansk pincers. 9 frontline sectors, 2024-25. The meaning of Kursk. Attrition levels.

2025 has ticked on by. The year has seen many promises of the war’s imminent end. So far, it’s easier to imagine another year of the same.

So what happened at the frontlines this year? Today we’ll examine the progression of this war of attrition.

This means looking at two forms of change: frontline territory, and the size of both armies. We’ll explore the front in detail, and I will explain why it is the battle for the south, not the Donbass, that I believe will be most important in deciding this war. Finally, I will gather together a range of estimates and statistics from over the year about Ukrainian and Russian losses, desertion rates, and recruitment levels.

Battles

Russia’s strategy in this war is that of ‘death by a thousand cuts’, as put by Ukrainian publication strana. The aim is to thin out Ukraine’s army across a frontline of over a thousand kilometers.

Given Ukraine’s ever-worsening personnel issues, this ensures that there will always be a new weak spot where Russian forces can push further. Where this results in an excessively narrow salient, such as that around Kupyansk and Zoloty Dobropillia, Ukrainian troops have been able to retake or contest the Russian gains.

But the main trend has been for wide Russian advances, outflanking Ukrainian positions and strangling their logistics with drones. Pressure is also maintained on well-defended areas to further stretch Ukrainian resources.

Let’s begin with the big picture. Here is a comparison between late December 2024 and the present, per Ukraine’s DeepState mapping resource.

I’ll break that down each of the squares I drew, again with the same December 2024/December 2025 comparison.

A: Kursk/Sumy oblasts

B: Northern Kharkiv oblast (Vovchansk)

C: Eastern Kharkiv oblast (Kupyansk)

D: Southeastern Kharkiv oblast

E: Northern Donetsk oblast (Lyman)

F: Central Donetsk oblast (Kostiantynivka)

G: Southern Donetsk oblast (Pokrovsk)

H: Donetsk/Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhia oblast intersection

We’ll see how this year, Russian troops have advanced through outflanking and encircling Ukrainian positions. To cite two memorable Ukrainian militarists I translated this year:

It’s hard to even look at that frontline from Kupyansk to the Zaporizhzhia region—continuous potential encirclements. (October)

Ukrainian soldiers also complained that higher-ups weren’t using these Russian tactics against them:

From what I see on the front lines, we can’t even outsmart them cleverly enough to make those faggots admit: “Wow, those Ukrainians are cunning.”

It’s simple: deceive them, outmaneuver them, let them advance somewhere only to trap them in a pincer movement, hit them using their own methods, and make them feel it. (January)

Kursk/Sumy oblasts

The Kursk/Sumy oblast saw Russia’s greatest advances this year, and it is worth pausing to examine it. Ukraine had launched a surprise attack on it in August 2024, initially taking around 1000 square kilometers, per DeepState. By December 2024, that territory shrank to around 600 square kilometers. And in March of this year, Russian troops rapidly retook the remaining 400 square kilometers.

Over the course of under three months, Ukrainian troops retreated 40 kilometers, from the deepest point in Russia’s Kursk oblast to the deepest point in Ukraine’s Sumy oblast. Russian advances towards the city of Sumy were stemmed over the past few months through fierce fighting.

Ukrainian efforts in Sumy still faced many problems. In June, I translated Ukrainian complaints about terrible or non-existent fortifications in the area, allowing for easy Russian advances.

In early July, I covered the problem of ‘zombie units’ sent to Sumy — newly formed brigades lacking experienced commanders, staffed with unmotivated troops. Desertion, incompetence, and massive losses were widely reported. Zombie units continue to be formed, as I wrote in early December.

How did the Russians advance?

The ingenious use of gas pipes for infantry infiltration was one remarkable Russian tactic witnessed in March, one that would be repeated in Kupyansk later in the year. I covered the Kursk pipe affair in a March article here.

The dramatic operation of retaking the Kursk oblast had the inadvertent effect of honing, if not creating, the drone colossus that has terrorized Ukrainian troops this year. It was in fighting for Kursk that Russia’s elite Rubicon drone team was formed (more on which in an upcoming article on the past year of drone war).

And it was the Kursk theatre that best showcased the Russian strategy of strangling Ukrainian logistics through drones, knowing that Ukrainian troops are under strict orders not to retreat. Taking heavy losses under conditions of logistical encirclement, the remaining Ukrainian troops were finally forced to flee in conditions that the BBC described as ‘catastrophe and panic’.

The aftermath of Kursk has has only begun to be digested. Already in early March, Ukrainian militarists were complaining that ‘Kursk is a joke that has dragged on.’ Other analysts I translated were very clear that Ukraine’s adventure in Kursk was doomed.

Many believed that the Kursk adventure had dragged valuable personnel away from fighting in the Donbass. A memorable expression of this came in early January. The frontline Ukrainian military blogger ‘Mannerheims Son’ responded to an effusive statement that day by head of the presidential administration Andriy Yermak - Yermak had claimed that there was ‘good news in Kursk’ (referring to one of the many failed ‘counter-offensives’ there):

If Andriy Borysovych’s posts make you want to shoot yourself, you’re not alone.

>You’re sitting in Pokrovsk;

>Retreating for the fifth month in a row;

>FPV drones with fiber optics are flying overhead;

>The right flank, as usual, is somewhere far behind;

>The vehicle broke down;

>Kursk region, good news…

Gunshot.

There has still been no real reckoning with the meaning of the Kursk operation in Ukraine. When it was first launched in late 2024, a number of elite nationalist troops opposed it, leading to their removal by commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrsky. In an October interview I translated here, top nationalist general ‘White Fuhrer’ Andriy Biletsky stuck to the safe claim that the operation went very well at the start, but dragged on too long. However, he refused to say when exactly Ukraine should have pulled out.

I expect the aftermath of Kursk to play a much larger role in Ukrainian political conflicts in future. Of course, Zelensky hopes to lionize it. In November, I covered news that the government was spending $50,000 USD to make a film glorifying the Kursk adventure.

Northern Kharkiv oblast (Vovchansk)

Territorially, nothing changed much here, but fighting for Vovchansk remained fierce throughout the year. According to Ukrainian military bloggers I translated a few days ago, Vovchansk is now fully under Russian control.

Due to the proximity of Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second largest city, many of Ukraine’s best forces were tied up stemming Russian advances here, like Sumy. The less visible southern sections of the front as well as the Donbass suffered.

Eastern Kharkiv oblast (Kupyansk)

Russia advanced across a wide front here. Most of the city of Kupyansk was taken by November, with an initial rapid advance into the city first reported in late July. I covered fighting there in September and October. Over the course of late November/early December, Ukraine scored its only notable advance of 2025, retaking at least part of the city. I covered both Ukrainian and Russian explanations of what has been happening there this month.

It should be noted that Ukrainian hopes of retaking all of Kupiansk were clearly premature. Earlier today, December 31, Ukrainian soldier Muchnoy Jugend sounded the alarm about new Russian tunnel infiltrations into parts of the city retaken by Ukraine:

With Russian forces active or advancing in both the northern (Vovchansk) and eastern (Kupyansk) borders of the Kharkiv oblast, Ukrainian soldiers have been warning about the threat of logistical encirclement. In September, I covered warnings by Ukrainian military bloggers that Russian drone strikes were turning the entire area between Vovchansk and Kupyansk into a large kill zone, making Ukrainian military presence there increasingly difficult:

Southeastern Kharkiv oblast

This section also covers the northernmost part of the Donetsk oblast which sees fighting. At the start of the year, Ukraine still held some villages in the westernmost part of the Lugansk oblast, but the entire oblast is now under Russian control.

Russian forces advanced on a wide front here, moving ever closer to the Oskil river.

In the north, Russia consolidated its spearhead towards the Kharkiv oblast village of Novoplatonivka, moving about 5 kilometers forward and a few kilometers on the flanks.

In the south, there was a major advance of about 25 kilometers between the Donetsk oblast towns of Terny and Novoselivka. Most of this took place from May to October, though the salient has continued widening since then.

Russia initially retreated from much of this territory back in September 2022. I don’t doubt that Russian generals are ruing their loss of the the Oskil river. Trying to cross it seems highly unwise. It is more likely that the Russians will try to outflank the wider sections by pushing forward in the south.

Northern Donetsk oblast (Lyman)

Moving further south, onto most of northern Donetsk oblast. This section is often called the Lyman direction. This section of the front is part of the emerging battle for the last remaining major cities of the Donetsk oblast, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk.

I first covered fighting there in July. In September, I covered major retreats (here and here) in the Serebriansky forest, to the north of Lyman. The loss of the so-called ‘forest of wonders’ was particularly notable because Ukraine’s glorious Azovite ultra-nationalists (1st NGU Corps and 3rd Army Corps) were meant to be holding it. How could it be that these fascist super-soldiers beloved by the western media lost to Russia’s orcish hordes?

Russian forces advanced around 15 kilometers from Bilohorivka to Siversk, and around 18 kilometers from Dibrova (Luhansk oblast) to Dibrova (Donetsk oblast). The advance here has been quite rapid, taking place mostly from August to the present. Dibrova was probably taken yesterday. I covered the fall of Siversk in mid-December.

Kramatorsk/Sloviansk

What will be the fate of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk? The have major symbolic significance as the last major cities of the Donbass, with Russian claims over them one of the main points of contention in negotiations.

It should be noted that their fall would have little effect on the Ukrainian economy at this point, in contrast to the ever-increasing threat faced by the far larger cities of the south. Both of these remaining Donetsk oblast cities had a pre-war population of 100-150 thousand.

It is reasonable to expect that 2026 will see fighting on the territory of both Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. or that they might even fall. For such major cities to fall over a non-excessive period of time, however, a major Russian outflanking operation would be necessary. This pincer operation has been unfolding over the course of the year. I covered it back in September. Here’s a comparison between December 2024 and the present.

One claw has pushed forward in the north - the Terny→Novoselivka advance I mentioned above.

The southern claw has moved north above Pokrovsk.

I also drew a claw in the centre, around the embattled town of Kostiantynivka, whose days also seem numbered.

Central Donetsk oblast (Kostiantynivka)

Let’s now move onto the Donetsk oblast in more detail. First, the pincer which has increasingly surrounded Kostiantynivka. Russian forces advanced around 22 kilometers in the south, from Vozdvyzhenka to Sofiivka.

There was a smaller advance of around 6 kilometers in the north, beyond the town of Chasiv yar.

Fighting for the Toretsk slag heaps to the south in March-May was also memorable. The Ukrainian government celebrated a costly operation to retake parts of the city. I translated agonizing stories by frontline soldiers. Naturally, the May ‘counter-offensive’ was soon forgotten, and the city was fully taken by Russia around August. The parallels with the recent ‘counter-offensive’ into Kupyansk are obvious.

Finally, the Russians moved forward by about 15 kilometers to reach the outskirts of Kostiantynivka, initially starting south of Kurdiumivka. I covered battles here in detail throughout the year (particularly in May, June, and August).

Southern Donetsk oblast (Pokrovsk)

Now, just south, the famous battle for Pokrovsk, along with Myrnohrad. The battle for the city dragged on over the entire year.

I covered initial Russian advances towards the logistical routes supplying the city in January. Already in May, Ukrainian military bloggers were warning that the inability to deal with Russian UAV dominance in the area would ‘trigger frontline collapse and immediate defensive failure at Pokrovsk.’

The dramatic November fall of the city, involving a now-infamous, probably failed Black Hawk helicopter mission by Ukrainian special forces, was detailed here. Later in November, I covered (seemingly unfulfilled) fears that Russian troops would advance more easily beyond Pokrovsk due to the supposed lack of defensive lines.

After the fall of the city, the Ukrainian army continues to send in PR-oriented assaults into the city, generally with the aim of putting up a Ukrainian flag for a few minutes (often at the cost of the flagbearers). One soldier I translated claimed that ‘dozens of lives’ were often lost due to such ridiculous operations.

Ukrainian military analysts tried to come up with ideas. I particularly enjoyed the late May proposition from the 46th Brigade to learn from the Wehrmacht’s 1942 Kharkiv offensive. The 46th believed copying these tactics would allow for Ukraine to stop Russian advances at Myrnohrad and Kostiantynivka. I translated it here.

In the east, there was the aforementioned 15 kilometer advance from Vozdvyzhenka to Sofiivka.

There was also one of the largest advances of the year after Kursk, that from Myroliubovka to Zoloty Koliadiaz - 30 kilometers.

Much of this was the ~14-18 kilometer salient Russia dramatically achieved in August, stretching from Volodymyrivka to Zolotyi Kolodiaz. Seemingly occurring over the course of a few days, it was certainly the largest advance of the war since early 2022, pointing to Ukraine’s increasingly desperate manpower issues. But due to the salient’s narrow, exposed nature and the intervention of a number of elite Ukrainian troops, most or all of it was eroded over the course of September and October.

Dubbed the Dobropillia breakthrough, I covered it as it occurred in August here, here, and here. In September, I covered claims of Russian troops encircled there. In early October, we examined Russian and Ukrainian counter-counter-attacks there. We also saw how Ukrainian MPs ridiculed official claims of successful ‘counter-offensives’ in the area. The fog of war has been particularly dense here. In mid-November, I covered claims in the Ukrainian media that commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrsky was playing a damaging role ‘micro-managing’ fighting in the area.

Ultimately, it does seem like the (rather scant) Russian forces in the Dobropillia salient were pushed out. However, many analysts believe that it was all simply a fairly successful distraction from the operation to take Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.

Finally, Russian troops advanced around 10 kilometers from Zelensky to the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk. The city fell under Russian control in November, though the Ukrainians continue to launch questionable PR missions into the city.

And to the southwest of Pokrovsk, Russian troops moved around 8 kilometers, from Solone towards the lone remaining highway supplying the city.

Donetsk/Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhia oblast interesction

Moving south, we reach the intersection of the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. The Zaporizhzhia oblast intersects with the two further south. Here’s a map showing the intersection I mean more clearly:

It is the south that was probably the most significant theatre of 2025, after the fall of the Kursk salient. There were many complaints from Ukrainian soldiers at the start of the year about low-quality defensive fortifications here. Besides that, there are fewer major cities here, and hence less symbolic significance to Russian advances.

In the southern three arrows, Russian troops advanced 30 kilometers. In the northern two arrows, they advanced 40 kilometers.

Most of the advances here have taken place over the past 6 months, after an initial push forward of 20 kilometers beyond Kurakhove in January/February. I covered the January/February encirclement of Ukrainian forces around Kurakhove here and here. I covered July advances into the Dnipropetrovsk oblast here — Ukrainian military bloggers were particularly disgusted by the lies of the General Staff, who flatly denied quite real Russian advances. A common complaint in this war — as a result, troops must die in suicide missions to ‘hold’ long-lost positions.

Zaporizhzhia oblast (Huliaipole and Stepnohirsk)

The Russians moved around 17 kilometers in the east, from Chervone to Prylyuty. The important city of Huliaipole was taken by Russia a few days ago, as I wrote here. Most notable was the speed of the advance — fighting for the city only lasted four weeks, a sharp contrast to the never-ending fighting for cities in the Donbass. Ukraine is particularly weak in the south.

To the west, Russian troops moved forward 10-20 kilometers, from Pyatykhatky to Malokaterynivka. It is unclear how much of what Ukraine’s DeepState claims is ‘gray zone’ is actually controlled by Russia. The town of Stepnohirsk is under fierce contestation by the Russians, and will probably fall at some point soon. I first covered fighting there in July.

This is the most dangerous section of the frontline for Ukraine. That’s because unlike the other sections I’ve discussed today, one of Ukraine’s largest cities is very close - Zaporizhzhia. The city is only 15-20 kilometers from Russian forces to its south (Stepnohirsk direction).

The city is also threatened from the east. With Russian advances past Huliaipole, no major towns remain until Zaporizhzhia, other than the strategic town of Vilniansk (to the northeast of Zaporizhzhia).

The south

As I said above, it is likely that 2026 will see symbolically significant battles for/captures of the Donetsk oblast cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. Their fall would theoretically make negotiations easier, as Zelensky would no longer have to be seen as diplomatically giving up the Donbass.

However, the south is much more important economically. It was in this November article that I explained why exactly Russian advances in the south are so dangerous, threatening to divide the frontline in half. Dnipro (population ~1 million) and Zaporizhzhia (population ~700,000) are the most important remaining industrial centers of the country. Zelensky and his political elite all hail from Dnipro and the nearby industrial city of Kriviy Rih.

In short, once the battle reaches this part of the country, Ukraine’s economic and political heartland will be under threat. This is something that will shake societal morale much more than the loss of some more cities in the Donbass, which have long been essentially disowned by much of Ukraine anyway.

And as we’ve seen, Russian advances have been largest here in the south, accounting for 40% of all advances in November. The landscape here is flat farmland, filled with the ubiquitous forested strips that allow small Russian infantry groups to move forward without being noticed by drones. Fortification construction over the 2014-22 period focused on the Donbass, not the south, with many reports of inexistent defensive constructions here.

Ukrainian soldiers have also often complained about the weakness of the units holding positions here, as I covered in late July. In October, I wrote about the brutal drunkard commanding the undermotivated troops sent on suicide missions around Huliaipole.

A December article examined in detail why Ukrainian positions were disintegrating in the south, focusing in particular on lack of coordination between different units. There have even been claims that some Ukrainian assault units have shot and killed undermotivated troops from other units trying to abandon positions here.

Ukraine may have improved its fortification construction, a topic for a future post. But more important than fortifications are the troops manning them, and there are serious issues with this in the south. Ukraine’s best troops have been focused on the Donbass due to the perceived value it holds in keeping western financial and military support.

Infantry

This is an attrition war. The army that can best sustain losses through recruitment wins.

I covered a number of claims and counter-claims about Ukrainian losses and recruitment levels in February. First, Zelensky claimed 45,000 Ukrainian troops KIA and 390,000 WIA over three years of war. Military journalists Yuri Butusov and Volodymyr Boiko had their own estimates - 70,000 and 105,000 KIA, respectively.

Other Ukrainian media drew attention to the fact that commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrsky was constantly complaining that mobilization wasn’t covering battlefield losses. But given Zelensky’s KIA and WIA figures (resulting in monthly losses of 10,000-11,000), the claimed monthly recruitment rates of 15,000-20,000 should be more than sufficient. Clearly, it is likely that battlefield losses are higher than claimed, and that desertion is bleeding the army dry.

My first article of 2025, from January 1, went into detail about a number of cases of mass desertion. Another July article examined fragging, desertion, and crimes by soldiers, as well as the incapacity of Ukraine’s court system to punish deserters.

Over the second half of the year, Ukrainian media has come out with a number of pessimistic estimates about the army. Due to the combined effects of battlefield losses, massive desertion rates, and lackluster mobilization rates, the army is apparently declining in size.

One of the most interesting estimates of Ukraine’s army came in July from Ihor Lutsenko, a nationalist Ukrainian politician and soldier:

The estimated rate of losses, according to Western media sources (The Economist, WSJ, Spiegel), is 5–8 thousand per month. To this, one can add a similar number of severely wounded who are out of action for a long time or permanently. … monthly mobilization of 30,000 is very likely not happening regularly, and even 20,000 could be considered a relatively successful figure. ….the reported figure of 19,000 deserters or soldiers absent without leave is clearly underestimated.

Conservatively, one could assume that the army is shrinking by 10–15 thousand people each month… the actual fighting force holding the front is far smaller than the “paper” one-million figure. Realistically, it’s perhaps 400–500 thousand (with only a small portion deployed on the front lines). It may even be closer to 300 thousand. And at this rate, within two more years, there will be no one left at the front.

Since July, desertion and AWOL rates have increased. The latest official statistics showed 21,000 such cases in October, an all-time monthly record. Following that unpleasant revelation, these statistics were made classified, with no statistics on the topic released for November. Over the course of 2025, almost 200,000 cases of desertion were recorded. There were almost 100,000 cases of desertion from 2022 to 2024.

This isn’t even getting into the question of how much these figures are an underestimate, with many Ukrainian military sources claiming that commanders fear reporting the true scale of desertions/AWOL. According to Ukraine’s Prosecutor’s Office in July, very few deserters actually return to their units, despite constant efforts to encourage this. Earlier in December, I wrote about how deserters returning to the army are now being forcibly sent to the infamous assault units — not a good way to encourage return.

Another estimate of net losses came in August, from the well-known military volunteer Maria Berlinska:

By my estimates, we have approximately the following daily figures:

Killed: up to 300
Wounded: up to 750
Desertions: up to 500
Approx. per day: 1,550
Approx. per month: 46,500
Mobilized: up to 20,000

So we’re going into a deficit of 26,500 per month.
Minus 318,000 per year.
Even if you immediately divide this figure by two (lightly wounded return, some deserters as well) – it’s still an astonishing number.

Minus 159,000 per year. And by the way, we haven’t had any “million-strong army” [as the government claims - EIU] for a long time.
…
The enemy is gaining roughly 9–10 thousand per month.
That’s plus 120 thousand per year. And they haven’t even really started mobilization yet.

Last week, I tried to come up with my own calculations of Ukrainian and Russian net personnel transformations over the course of 2025, also based off establishment western and Ukrainian sources. Using a fairly conservative estimate of a 1:3 KIA:WIA ratio, I concluded that the Russian army has grown by 150,000 men over the course of 2025, whereas the Ukrainian army shrank by 80,000.

Because of the lack of men, Russian troops have been able to slip between Ukrainian positions. As I wrote in October, the distance between frontline Ukrainian positions ranges from 200 meters to even a kilometer. The result is an increasingly chaotic mixture of Russian and Ukrainian troops, eroding static conceptions of a linear frontline.

Besides the numbers of those mobilized, there is also the question of quality. On the 22nd of December, Ukraine’s military ombudsman again admitted that sick men are being mobilized. I covered the prevalence of tuberculosis in the army here, here, and here.

There have been a wealth of other signs of Ukraine’s infantry woes this year. In January, the army began transferring skilled aviation personnel to the frontline trenches, leading to some public consternation.

The recent surprise Russian advance at the Sumy oblast village of Hrabovske also illustrates the state of Ukrainian morale levels. As I wrote in my article on it a few days ago, Ukrainian border troops were apparently too busy getting drunk and engaging in all sorts of antics to put up any resistance.

It isn’t only infantry being depleted. Here’s an interesting passage from a Ukrainian military blogger I translated in January:

The issue is that we’ve run out of personnel for brigade formation. There’s a lack of sergeants and officers at the company-battalion level. There’s no one left to train the personnel, share experience, lead them into battle, or even simply guide them to positions

Other frontline military bloggers I translated in January understood quite well the Russian strategy of attrition, and cursed their superiors for falling for it. By holding to territory at any price, the army continues losing precious manpower, without being capable of properly replenishing it through mobilization:

Unfortunately, the losses here [Kurakhove area - EIU] are quite high. I still can’t understand why this area is so important to our leadership. For our soldiers, it feels like agony, and it only plays into the hands of the Russians. The longer we stay there, the higher the losses will be.

….The enemy’s primary goal right now is simply to deplete our defensive resources so that we’re unable to hold other territories in the future.’

….The situation with infantry is truly dire. In the Pokrovsk direction, the enemy is advancing at a pace that is only possible due to the limitations of our drones. There is literally no one left to hold the positions.’

The future

How much longer can Ukraine continue? I don’t think there will be any massive collapse any time soon. Things will get worse, but steadily. People will continue dying. Rapid advances like the Dobropillia salient may repeat themselves, but are likely to meet the same fate if they are simply a vulnerable salient. Nevertheless, the bleeding out of the Ukrainian army will surely make it harder to stem these advances, particularly without leaving the rest of the frontlines vulnerable.

What will be truly decisive are Russia’s constant, more gradual advances in the south. Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro are likely to come under severe threat in 2026. That will mark a qualitative shift in the war.

But ultimately, I find it quite possible that I will find myself penning another annual frontline writeup in December 2026…