All going to peaces

Today’s post is about recent statements by president Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials and pro-government experts indicating a new appreciation for the idea of freezing the war along the frontline. Not surprising in conditions of Russian military successes, and more importantly, a Russian military strategy of attrition that Ukraine stands to lose.

The signals

To begin with, on June 23 head of the Main Directorate of Intelligence Kyryllo Budanov stated that Ukraine ‘wouldn’t fight to our last citizen’. Of course, he made his usual remarks about how Ukraine will rely on advanced technologies instead, but even here, he was more pessimistic than usual, admitting that drone strikes on Russian oil infrastructure wasn’t a critical blow. He is quite an important figure, one of the last centres of power outside the Zelensky/Yermak ecosystem. And one known to be quite close to the west.

On June 27, Zelensky came out with an interesting statement, abandoning his previous 1991 borders formula. At a meeting with EU leaders in Brussels, he stated:

Ukraine does not want to prolong the war; we do not want it to continue for years. We must put a settlement plan on the table within a few months

Then on June 28, he made the following statement:

It is very important for us to show a plan for ending the war that will be supported by the majority of the world. This is the diplomatic path we are working on. Not everything depends on us; our production of technology, drones, and artillery is indeed increasing because we must be strong on the battlefield. Because Russia understands nothing but force. These are two parallel processes: being strong and developing a detailed and clear plan, which will be ready this year.

And finally, on June 30 he gave a fairly vague answer to the Philadelphia Inquirer about Ukraine’s definition of victory, which didn’t involve reference to the 1991 borders:

In practical terms, the first part of Zelensky’s “real victory” is “not to allow the full destruction of everything Ukrainian” by Putin.

….

The second part of “real victory,” Zelensky specified, “is security for today and for future Ukrainian generations, and the impossibility of the repetition of aggression.

“We should be in the European Union for economic security. And we should be in NATO for physical security. If we don’t have these two, there is a huge risk for us that the enemy will come back,” he said.

The second condition is particularly notable, given that a July 3 survey showed that 45% of Ukrainians are ready to give away the territories currently controlled by Russia if the rest of the country can join the EU and NATO.

Then on June 30 Volodymyr Fesenko, a pro-government political expert, stated in an interview that Ukraine will not have lost if it keeps its capital and access to the black sea. The statement was first made by his interviewer, the famous journalist Nataliya Mosiychuk, who generally sticks to the standard patriotic line:

People need to understand: the one who still has the capital, most of the territories, and access to the sea is not losing the war

Fesenko agreed with her, and went on to say:

Our main interest is not just to regain territories; we must preserve the state and the nation. Territories can be regained later. Preserving the state and the nation is what's most important now. And leading the country into the EU and NATO. This is the formula for our victory.

Fesenko also noted Zelensky’s dangerous position. He claims the president’s enemies are trying to ‘lead him into a trap’:

They say: you must make peace, since it is impossible to win the war due to the disparity in resources. But if you make peace with Russia, you are a traitor, we will brand you as such, you have lost this war.

He then said that nationalists (hinting at Poroshenko) would be happy for Ukraine to shrink to the size of Galicia (western Ukraine), so long as they could be military dictators there.

Then on June 30, Chief of Staff of Azov, Bohdan Krotevych, attacked such a message on twitter, without naming who exactly he was responding to:

There is no peace without victory. Victory means no Russian soldiers on Ukrainian territory. We will not leave this war to our descendants, and neither will you, because if you try, it will be bad. For you and for them. If this is a "test of strength," don't even think about it. Written with restraint.

On July 2, Ihor Zhovka of the president’s office declined to call Hungarian president Orban’s suggestion to freeze the conflict a ‘Russian narrative’. He was asked whether Orban’s proposal was such a pernicious narrative and whether the Ukrainian government would dismiss it, and he gave a vague answer:

I will tell you that this is not the first country to speak about such a possible scenario. The President of Ukraine listened to his interlocutor but then stated his position in response. Ukraine's position, as you correctly say, is quite clear, understandable, and well-known. …It's not just about Russian narratives…. Such processes cannot be viewed in isolation.

Disagreements

I wrote in a recent post about how certain Ukrainian militarists, both inside parliament in liberal-nationalist parties like Golos, and in the army, are agitating to push down the age of mobilization from 25 to 20.

However, parliamentarian from Zelensky’s party and member of the parliamentary national security committee Fedor Venislavsky stated on June 24 the government wasn’t planning to lower the mobilization age to 20. He also noted that there are existing situations where individuals younger than 25 can be mobilized, which I wrote about here. Mykhailo Podolyak, advisor to the head of the office of the president (Yermak) confirmed that the government wasn’t planning to lower the mobilization age on June 26.

This may show the presence of contradictions between the Zelensky elite and the more bloodthirsty new ‘activist elite’ that I wrote about in my last post about scam call centres. Those agitating to lower the mobilization age are representatives of Azov (straightforward military fascists) and parliamentarians like Lozinsky (western-funded liberal nationalists), an alliance which has been fusing both politically and economically (in Dnepr’s scam Offices).

The stage does seem to be set for further confrontation. On June 28, Azov’s Bohdan Krotevych stated he was still dissatisfied with the answer regarding his letter to the SBI (State Bureau of Investigations) on Sodol (see my recent article on this saga). Well-known nationalist politician Ihor Lutsenko made a long facebook post on June 27 predicting a showdown between the ‘young and old’ (in spirit, not only age) generations of the military, by which he means the ‘corrupt soviet generals’ versus the ‘new nationalist elite’.

On June 30, Zelensky’s attack dog Marianna Bezuhla submitted a letter to the SBI regarding Syrsky, who apparently refuses to meet with her. I’d say that Bezuhla’s goal right now is to try and take the heat off Zelensky, and make it seem like he is also ‘against the bad generals’, so as to not allow the likes of Krotevych and Lutsenko to ride the wave of discontent. I wrote here about the likelihood that Syrsky will be removed, and Bezuhla’s recent attacks on him.

Lutsenko’s ‘young generation of warriors’ aren’t the youngest. According to a Deutsche Welle/Euronews investigation, 74,000 children are training at government-supported military camps, particularly in western Ukraine. Those interviewed stated they hoped to head to the frontline, and aim to ‘get rid of the enemy from our land’. Nothing to be seen here of any more conciliatory tone.

Number mysteries

Why search for meaning in the fickle statements of politicians? Ultimately, it’s the finances that decide anyway.

On June 30, the IMF stated it predicted that Ukraine would continue to have an energy deficit until 2026. Why not after? The IMF stated this would be possible due to a reconstruction of the energy system, financed by an increase in electricity prices (a topic I’ll write about soon). But why wouldn’t Russia keep chucking missiles? I doubt the IMF believes in Budanov’s theories about the ever-shrinking supply of Russian missiles. Even he doesn’t bring that one up too much anymore.

Perhaps this is linked with Ukraine’s 2026 budget released on July 1, which plans to decrease military spending by 50%. Clearly, the government has something planned for 2025. Of course, they’ve stated before how there’ll be another counter-offensive and so on. But given the aforementioned rhetoric, perhaps something else is planned.

Stay tuned for upcoming commentary on just how possible this 180 degree transformation by the Ukrainian government on questions of war and peace is. To access it and help me continue putting out research, consider becoming a paid subscriber.