Frontline news:
Chinese drone catastrophe, speculation about the Pokrovsk mystery - Syrsky's cunning plan?
Madyar, a Ukrainian military officer with over 300,000 subscribers. The Drone Guy in the Ukrainian informational space:
The Aftertaste of This 'Ni Hao' Restriction from September 1st Will Come Gradually, Like the Stages of Cancer, Sorry."
‼️ Get Ready for a New Challenge for Everyone Involved in the Use of Drones. And it will be incomparable to the temporary shortages of ammunition. Those (ammunition, not drones) are occasionally supplied by our Partners. But it won’t be the same with drones. It will be expensive and scarce. And a few dozen new millionaires will appear, of various 'kinds.'
I have a feeling that the restriction described below will become one of the components pushing us to the negotiation table. And not on equal terms at all.
We're talking about the next wave of export restrictions from the Celestial Empire. A month ago, the Chinese government announced restrictions starting on September 1st on the export of a whole range of goods related to UAVs. The announcement of these restrictions went largely unnoticed, because 'raising the alarm' often borders on 'crying wolf' here, and there are no authoritative China analysts in Ukraine. So, in specialized chats, the topic was briefly discussed and then forgotten. Likely, local manufacturers (and assemblers are called that here too, though the designs are some of the best in the world, yet everything is assembled from imported Chinese components) have poured all their working capital into purchasing these spare parts, because they have obligations and/or see a solid premium on scarce, banned goods.
Stocks are not infinite, and the smuggling routes for delivering banned goods are, to put it mildly, different for us and the enemy.
Thus, yesterday and today, everyone involved received the following announcements from the largest carriers:
"Dear customers ….. ….. Please note the important changes in the list of goods that are prohibited for transport weighing up to 30 kg.
🚨 From September 1, 2024, exports from China will be subject to even stricter inspections. Banned goods will not be available for air or sea delivery.
Starting September 1, 2024, we will no longer be able to accept the following items for transport: Carbon frame for quadcopter Carbon beam for quadcopter Quadcopter Motor for quadcopter Set of parts for quadcopter Set of frames for quadcopters Navigation camera for quadcopter Flight controller for quadcopter Landing gear for quadcopter Propeller for quadcopter Frame for quadcopter Signal booster for quadcopter remote control Digital data transmission system for quadcopter Digital radio communication detector Radio system Radio station Portable radio Video signal transmission system via radio channel Electronic warfare systems…"
The situation is crap.
We will fight as long as we have the strength.
That's it…
MADYAR 🇺🇦 29.08.24
And a quite interesting, albeit speculative post by Evgeny Norin on August 28. Norin is a respected Russian military historian. His ruminations on the Pokrovsk mystery have been quite popular among Russian military bloggers, though of course not all agree:
In summary, regarding the seemingly absurd concerns of the "armchair general staff":
I'm not much of a military analyst, but there are some things I'd like to discuss. Look, we have this situation on the front lines. Our forces are pressing on Selydove, pressing on Pokrovsk, and in some areas, the enemy is already openly abandoning some positions; the line is cracking. Meanwhile, it's well-known that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have several relatively intact, more or less fully equipped units in reserve, about five brigades. If they’re not throwing everything that moves into the battle near Pokrovsk, it means that a) they intend to deploy their reserves somewhere else, and b) they need to create some sort of devastating effect before the front in Donbas collapses completely. So, it suggests that we might see a repeat of something like the Sudzha operation. What could this be? For example, a second pincer movement in the Kursk region, which will be executed at the moment when we relax and decide that the offensive has been repelled and that it was all just a publicity stunt.
Why are we assuming that this was done purely for PR? Because they didn’t reach Kurchatov? But what if that was just a diversionary strike and the main blow will be delivered, for example, from Hlukhiv toward Rylsk to link up with the southern group? The distance from the border to Rylsk via highway is 30+ km—a quite manageable distance if they break through the first line, and as practice has shown, they can break through the first line. Take a package of several well-prepared brigades and rush into a maneuverable battle. What do we have in terms of reserves? Who knows. And if significant forces find themselves between this group and the southern one, well, that’s what’s called a cauldron. Also, by the way, they haven’t even used their aviation yet, including those F-16s.
In any case, if they’re not using their operational reserves in Donbas, it means they’re saving them for something else. And whether our side is ready for that something—I don’t know. In short, I want to shout “Goida!” (Let’s go!), but if the enemy is clearly not an idiot and is acting inexplicably strange, then there’s some kind of explanation—it’s just that they don’t want it to be obvious.
Resident, an anonymous Ukrainian telegram with over a million subscribers had a similar idea on August 29:
⚡️⚡️⚡️**#Insider Information**
Our source in the General Staff has reported that the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the Eastern Front are lacking heavy equipment and reserves needed for a flanking strike against advancing Russian units. Syrskyi not only deployed reserves but also pulled some brigades with equipment from Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk for the Kursk operation. Now, a quick decision is needed to transfer forces back to Donbas to prevent the front from collapsing.
There was a response on August 29 from ‘ZeRada’, an anonymous Ukrainian telegram with over 400,000 subscribers:
🔥 Counteroffensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces
Colleagues are speculating about a possible counteroffensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Pokrovsk direction.
To be honest, we've been scratching our heads for the past two days, trying to answer the question of what exactly is happening on this section of the front. The option of abandoning these territories as non-priority is not being considered because, as we’ve already written [link], the importance of this section of the front is hard to overestimate.
It’s also hard to believe that the distributed pressure being applied by the Russian Armed Forces across the entire front line has suddenly worked in one particular direction, since the "average" temperature across the rest of the front is roughly the same: Russian advances are very slow. But here, it's a complete disaster.
At the same time, the Russian Armed Forces are proceeding quite carefully and competently. We've mentioned that for a turn to the south, they really need Novohrodovka, ideally also Hrodovka and Selydove. These three points would serve as a backbone for the turn to the south. But they’ve already taken Novohrodovka, are practically in Hrodovka, and today there are battles in Selydove. Therefore, a frontal counteroffensive is out of the question.
A counteroffensive from below is also not feasible because an assault group needs to be trapped. So, in general, it’s not a serious option.
A strike from the north is the only acceptable option. The biggest problem is that there are no large settlements there where troops can be concentrated unnoticed.
There’s also the problem of losing New York. If the Ukrainian Armed Forces do begin to concentrate troops north of the Pokrovsk direction, west of Toretsk, for a strike to the south, they could always be flanked from New York.
But the most important factor is the concentration of Russian forces in this direction. A 150,000-strong group can always find reserves and deploy them to counter the counteroffensive. Therefore, it’s not fair to compare the kilometers the Ukrainian Armed Forces would need to cover to cut off the main supply artery running through Ocheretyne (where it's just 5 km) with the kilometers covered in the Kursk region, where there were only a few conscript units and the element of surprise. Here, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are dealing with the most powerful Russian group on the front.
There is also the problem of motivated reserves:
Some combat-capable brigades are rotating after the battles for Ocheretyne,
Some have already been withdrawn from Kursk with significant losses,
Some are still in Kursk.
Therefore, Syrskyi’s reserve is quite limited, and the Russians know it. This was one of the major problems of the Kursk operation, as the number of mobile reserves for the Ukrainian Armed Forces has significantly decreased, which frees the hands of the Russian Armed Forces.
Therefore, we don't particularly believe in a counteroffensive in this area.