Igor Kolomoyskyi: the fine line between corruption and state interest
Igor Kolomoyskyi: the fine line between corruption and state interest
Translation of a 2008 interview with Ukraine's most notorious oligarch. Kolomoisky's adoration for and sponsorship of the orange revolution. His myriad business feuds. His love for weak government.
Originally published on Ukrainian Truth/Ukrainska Pravda, the Ukrainian New York Times, a liberal publication supported by USAID and purchased in 2021 by the Fiala/Soros group ‘Dragon Capital’. Kolomoisky is interviewed by Leschenko and Naiem, two classic maidan journalists. One of my recent articles has focused on the post-2014 antagonism between Naiem, the ‘first man at euromaidan’, and Kolomoisky. The following content is highly relevant to my recent articles about the deep history of the 2004 Orange Revolution. Some other themes to note:
The battle between the Donetsk elite (Akhmetov) and the Dnepropetrovsk elite (Kolomoisky). Itself represented by the struggle between the Party of Regions and the euroatlanticist ‘Orange’ politicians (Yuschenko, Poroshenko, Tymoshenko)
Significant financial support to the Orange Revolution by Kolomoisky, as well as support for ‘Pora’, the Serbian ‘Otpor’ style Gene Sharpian ‘student protest group’ which played a role in the 2004 Orange Revolution
Note that the media empire 1+1 included Kvartal 95, where Zelensky became the main star. This is how he came into close relations with Kolomoisky. In later interviews which I will try translate, Kolomoisky is quite open about his support for Zelensky in the 2019 elections. Of course, one doesn’t have to ask Kolomoisky to notice that.
Kolomoisky’s conflict with Yuliya Timoshenko - former hero of the Orange Revolution and prime minister since 2005 - over gas prices. ‘Everyone is said to have their own interests.’ At some point I will try to write something more about the endless ‘gas wars’ that have been so important in Ukrainian politics and broader geopolitics around the country, but honestly, the complexity and intentional opacity of the topic always frustrates me.
In terms of the post-2004 Yuschenko-Tymoshenko conflict (they were allied during the Orange Revolution but quickly descended into endless bickering once in power), Kolomoisky says he preferred Yuschenko because he interfered less in the economy and was generally a weaker figure.
Kolomoisky says that he has sponsored every political group in Ukraine apart from the Socialists and Communists. He describes himself as a Social Democrat but one who is opposed to state interference in the economy.
When asked about the results of the 2004 revolution and mass disappointment in it, he responds that it has succeeded because the number of millionaires is increasing.
It is also noteworthy when Kolomoisky praises the post-2004 rise in Ukrainian consumption, since Ukraine’s GDP collapsed because of the 2008 GFC precisely because Yuschenko tied its economy to speculative western credits in return for increased consumption alongside deindustrialization.
A final note to the reader - Kolomoisky’s interviews are always characterized by a comic mix between hilarious one-liners - politics is a game. In some ways, it's an attempt to be honest with oneself - and interminable discussions of his business disputes and totally opaque ‘explanations’ of the structure of his sprawling economic empire. Which, of course, only goes to prove his reputation as a businessman whose assets function through opacity and trickery.
In the midst of the Orange Revolution in the lobby of one of the Dnipropetrovsk TV channels owned by the "Privat" group, an open microphone was set up for anyone wishing to speak about events in the country.
By chance, on the same day, co-owner of "Privatbank" Igor Kolomoisky came to the channel's office. As he was leaving the director's office, he almost came into the camera's view and decided to wait until the speech of another city resident, who was agitating against Viktor Yushchenko, was over. "These Orange ones are thieves themselves, just like everyone else - look at their cars!" a healthy young guy shouted into the camera.
The oligarch listened to the accusations against the Orange camp for a long time, and then turned to his friend who was standing nearby and dryly added, "And he's telling the truth, they're all the same. Tretyakov and Poroshenko probably don't ride on trams."
Nevertheless, for the fourth year now, Igor Kolomoisky has been considered the constant sponsor of the Orange camp of Ukrainian politicians. Without having his own political party, Kolomoisky exerts influence on Ukrainian politics comparable to the level of influence of the chief sponsor of the Party of Regions, Rinat Akhmetov.
Igor Kolomoisky can rightfully be considered the most secretive oligarch in Ukraine. Having amassed a huge fortune, he has earned a reputation as the most notorious, tough, and cynical businessman in the country.
For an ordinary citizen, his name is associated with anything but the transparent ownership structure which the co-owner of SCM [Systems Capital Management, Akhmetov’s mega-company] boasts of. Most often, the senior partner of the Privat Group is called a raider, a fraudster, a swindler, and almost never a businessman.
This extensive interview with "Ukrainska Pravda" was recorded in the very heart of the Privat Group - in the office of the company "Sentoza" - one of the original founders and current shareholders of "Privatbank." In a large hall with two billiard tables and an aquarium covering the entire wall, the oligarch entered wearing jeans and a sweater.
ABOUT POLITICS
– Do you consider yourself an oligarch?
– No.
– Why not? You have influence in politics, and yet you are a businessman.
– I have limited influence in politics - perhaps more of a desire to influence than opportunities to realize those desires.
– What does politics mean to you?
– It's a game. In some ways, it's an attempt to be honest with oneself - to say that I tried to do something to see society the way I imagine it.
– What should society be like in your imagination?
– Just.
– So, are you a socialist?
– I think I'm not a socialist, but more of a social democrat. (Laughs)
– Are you satisfied with at least one person you introduced to politics or supported?
– I can't say I'm satisfied with anyone because I haven't introduced anyone to politics.
– Which political forces in Ukraine have you never supported?
– Communists and socialists.
– And Yulia Tymoshenko?
– I supported her morally.
– Only morally?
– Yes, mostly morally rather than materially. There may have been some material assistance to BYuT (Yulia Tymoshenko's party) at the local level. Our companies located in Lviv or Ivano-Frankivsk regions could have collaborated with local BYuT branches.
– But your guys, Andriy Portnov and Stanislav Oleynik, were on the BYuT list for the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament)!
– Yes, but I can't say they are our guys. What Portnov wrote about our relationship is very close to the truth.
I occasionally communicate with him, exchange opinions, consult. But it's not the same kind of work we had when he had his own law business.
I haven't seen or heard from Oleynik for a long time, practically since 2006, we haven't been working with him.
– Did you support the Party of Regions?
– Never.
– What about Viktor Yanukovych personally?
– During the 2004 presidential elections, big business voluntarily and involuntarily supported Yanukovych.
– And Viktor Yushchenko?
– Back then, we couldn't support Yushchenko, but now we support him morally 100 percent.
– How much did you spend on the Orange Revolution?
– "Privatbank" didn't incur any expenses at all, and each of the shareholders, I believe, allocated their funds for various activities. Personally, I spent up to five million dollars to support the revolution.
– Through which channels were these funds transferred?
– We had several channels, starting with Brodsky. It's not the time yet to name their names.
– How many people in "Our Ukraine" are oriented toward you?
– I don't think there are people in "Privat" or me personally oriented toward them.
– What about Igor Palitsa?
– You could say he's oriented toward "Ukrneft."
– But you are in direct contact with Palitsa, right?
– Yes, of course. I consider Igor Palitsa today a classic lobbyist... But overall, I don't think anyone today can influence "Our Ukraine."
Perhaps it's because it's not such a large structure in terms of numbers. NU-NS (Our Ukraine - National Self-Defense) is a conglomerate of various political forces. Each of them is quite ideologized, consisting of established individuals with a reputation who won't compromise themselves for support or lobbying of someone else's private interests. Especially if it often goes against their conscience.
– What about Yuriy Yekhanurov? Do you financially support him?
– Financially, no.
– What about his new project?
– It hasn't been announced yet. I've only heard that he left "Our Ukraine."
– Did Yekhanurov tell you about it personally?
– We discussed similar scenarios during friendly lunches, birthday congratulations.
– Is it true that at one point you were willing to finance "Pora"?
– We had negotiations with "Pora" at one point. I, Korban, and Filatov (lawyers and partners of "Privat") were there [Filatov is now mayor of Dnepropetrovsk, renamed to Dnipro - eventsinukraine], and someone from "Pora," I think it was Kaskiv.
The discussion was about providing financial assistance to "Pora" in 2006, and Boris Filatov either wanted to be on the "Pora" list or was offered that opportunity. But then it didn't work out.
– Is it true that you have a requirement for political projects you support, that there should be no people associated with Pinchuk [another influential pro-western oligarch from Dnepropetrovsk - eventsinukraine]?
– When we talk about people associated with Pinchuk, let me tell you a story. In 2006, we had a conversation with Mr. Kravchuk - he was related to Mr. Lytvyn, his son was married to Lytvyn's daughter. The discussion was about supporting the People's Party.
We said that there are several names that cause us allergic reactions within the People's Party. The first was Mr. Yeremyev, who needed to be removed from the bloc's cashier position. We weren't on very friendly terms with him at the time. We were going through a divorce process at the Drogobych Oil Refinery, and he was leaving the enterprise, and we were involved.
The second was that we heard that Mrs. Chebotareva (at that time, one of the leaders of Interpipe, Pinchuk’s company) was on Lytvyn's list. We said, "We can only discuss this if Chebotareva is removed from the list." But it was said in a joking manner. Perhaps that's why rumors started about our unwillingness to support projects with Pinchuk-associated individuals.
– Did you support "Our Ukraine" during both the 2006 and 2007 election campaigns?
– I supported them, and we didn't help anyone else. Except for Brodsky in the last campaign.
– Why? You knew it was a non-starter project.
– Brodsky asked for our help. And we supported him more with his money. (Laughs.) Brodsky mostly handled this task on his own and financed the entire campaign individually, and we were there as a backup.
– How much did the "Privat" group spend on the previous election campaigns?
– Let's be clear, these are all my personal projects and my personal involvement in politics.
– But your support for parties and blocs affects the overall business of "Privat"!
– It may or may not affect the overall business. It can have negative or positive effects...
For instance, Martynov is generally apolitical. And Bogolyubov is a staunch opponent of involvement in political life. So, my support for various politicians has no bearing on the overall business.
– So, tell me, how much did you personally spend on the 2006 and 2007 election campaigns?
– Personally, I spent around $40 million on both campaigns.
– So, you spent eight times more than on the Orange Revolution...
– Yes. We spent the money not to make a profit.
– For what purpose? Just for fun?
– A friend of mine from Moscow told me about Berezovsky's [a famous pro-western Russian oligarch who fled Russia to the UK in 2000 - eventsinukraine] reaction to a picture on TV during the Orange Revolution. When they were discussing how much money had been spent, Berezovsky allegedly said, "Yes, $40 million, of course, it's a pity, but what a crowd!" (Laughs)
– Do you have the same feelings?
– No, I don't have the same feelings. The thing is, Berezovsky lives in London, and his Ukraine may concern him a little more than Georgia. Or maybe less.
– Do you communicate with Berezovsky?
– I'm not even acquainted with him. I saw him once in 1999 at Kuchma's [then-president of Ukraine - eventsinukraine] inauguration. He flew by, surrounded by a retinue, and everyone wanted to greet him... Well, I watched it all from the sidelines. But I wasn't introduced.
– You had a unique project, the Peasant Party, in the 2006 elections. Martynov and Palitsa were on the electoral list. Can you tell me how they ended up there?
– This project didn't happen by chance. (Laughs) As far as I know, Martynov is interested in helicopter and aviation sports, and through that, he has various friends. One of them, I think, became the leader of this party, and he pulled Martynov into the project and put him in the top five. Maybe they invited Palitsa to join the "warm company" over a drink. But I didn't spend a penny on that; they used their personal funds. (Laughs)
– Let's talk about legends surrounding Kolomoisky. The phrase "suckers have to be ripped off" – is it your creation?
– No, not at all mine. By the way, I have a very negative attitude toward the word "suckers" and consider it an undignified word.
If the word "sucker" in the usual sense is used to refer to consumers, ordinary people, or the public, in my understanding, the word "sucker" is associated with someone who should be deceived, cheated, or somehow manipulated to extract their savings.
So, I don't have a very favorable view of the word "suckers," as swindling and fraud don't appeal to me.
– The second catchphrase attributed to you is "I don't pay taxes and don't return debts."
– That's a legend created by Mr. Vydry. Apparently, when he writes his articles, he likes to have a glass of cognac. So, it must have occurred to him in a drunken haze.
He has personally apologized to me several times. I told him, "You don't need to apologize to me personally, do it publicly. Because you've spread this phrase everywhere, and you never heard it from me. Supposedly, it was passed to you by me, and I suspect that Brodsky did it."
– Who is Brodsky to you? A partner, a contact for special assignments?
– He's our long-time friend, an acquaintance, a buddy. More than a partner. We've known each other since the end of 1996 or the beginning of 1997, and we were partners in "Kyivski Vedomosti" [a newspaper].
People become friends when they've experienced pleasant moments with another person, spent pleasant days, and received some positive emotions. Our friendship with Brodsky began with negative emotions.
We've had so much trouble together that we couldn't do without each other anymore. (Laughs)
ON MEDIA, 1+1, AND UKRNEFT
– What media outlets do you currently own or control?
– I know that my friend Gennadiy Bogolyubov has been in touch with Mr. Lozhkin, they have warm relations, and Lozhkin is involved in some joint projects – "Focus" magazine and "Komsomolskaya Pravda."
– How do they divide their shares?
– I think it's 50-50, no less than 50% would be acceptable to Bogolyubov.
As for me, I am a partner with Tretyakov in "Glavred," which owns UNIAN, "Profil," and some other publications. Tretyakov is the managing partner there. But besides that, I have an adventurous story with "1+1."
– Tell me your version of how it all happened with the purchase of "1+1" and how it ended.
– I would like to postpone that story for some time. Currently, the CEM (Central European Media) group is in the process of a deal with Fuchsman and Rodnyansky. As a member of the CEM board of directors, I know that there is a confidentiality agreement in place, and I wouldn't want to jeopardize the deal. When everything is completed, and the parties are out of the buying and selling process, then we can discuss it.
– How did you execute your role as the curator of "1+1" within CEM? Not long ago, your partner Gennadiy Korban stated that you are responsible for the Ukrainian part of the CEM business.
– I am not the curator of the Ukrainian part of the CEM business. It may seem that way to Korban, perhaps that's what he wishes for. But Korban, unfortunately or fortunately, is neither a shareholder nor a manager of CEM . Therefore, he is not in the know, to put it mildly...
CEM is structured in a way that there is no director overseeing specific countries on the board of directors. There is a board of directors that deals with all issues, including Ukraine. Then there are direct managers who are responsible for Ukraine.
– Have you participated in any CEM board of directors meetings?
– I haven't had the chance yet. Not once. I hope to attend an CEM board of directors meeting in Bucharest soon.
– What recommendations would you give them for the Ukrainian market?
– The only thing is to quickly end the relationship with Fuchsman and Rodnyansky.
– Is it true that you bought the TET channel?
– Half of the ownership. I went in but haven't finalized it yet. But I've already made a deal with the Surkises. We are friends through our misfortunes.
– What do the Surkises have to do with '1+1'?
– They are just as affected in the 'pluses' as we are, they also paid Rodnyansky for shares. The thing is, they paid with their money at the same time I did.
– What's this news?! How will Surkis and Rodnyansky part ways now?
– They've already worked it all out. The Surkises didn't publicize their role in this story before. It was our joint project with them.
– So, do you and Surkis now own 3% of CEM together?
– No, separately. I paid for CEM shares with my own money. And when we figure out the whole situation, the Surkises will get their interest, either in CEM shares or in money. But they won't be among the owners of '1+1'.
– Who was intended to be the head of the TET channel from your team?
– As the executive producer, we invited Savik Shuster [a very pro-EU TV personality of Lithuanian heritage - eventsinukraine]. His task was to oversee the channel with the aim of increasing ratings. He initially took it on with enthusiasm, but then, when he got involved with [Pinchuk’s] 'Inter,' he became too busy.
– By the way, when you had a conflict with Fuchsman and Rodnyansky, 'Ukrainska Pravda' rented an office in the building next to Rodnyansky's apartment. And due to your tensions, Rodnyansky's security was increased, they were constantly in the yard, checking the attic, basements. Why are people afraid of you?
– There are two explanations. First, maybe they really are scared and are afraid. And the other version is that Rodnyansky's security just wants to earn extra money, so they add extra work, show their significance and necessity.
– But you can't demonize a person from scratch. What makes people hire security in case of a conflict with Kolomoisky?
– That 'something' makes me hire security in case of a conflict with someone.
– With whom? What was the last conflict that made you hire security?
– I hired it back in 1998.
– Because of a conflict with Lazarenko [the infamous prime minister under Kuchma - eventsinukraine]?
– We didn't have a conflict with Lazarenko. There was a general uneasy situation back then.
– What do you know about negotiations regarding the supposed merger of 'Inter' and CEM?
– I know that negotiations were ongoing from the second half of 2007, but they ended with nothing. The positions of the parties at that time were so far apart from each other that the negotiations immediately ended.
– Is it true that part of the assets of 'Inter' came under the control of Dmitry Firtash [another one of Ukraine’s most powerful oligarchs, whose business had much to do with gas flows from Russia - eventsinukraine]?
– Rumors have long circulated about part of the 'Inter' assets going to Firtash. There were also rumors that part of the assets went to Mr. Hayduk and Taruta. Personally, I haven't seen any documents, but I lean more towards the version with Firtash. So, if anything did transfer from Horoshkovsky, it probably went more to Firtash than to Hayduk and Taruta.
– Was the current advertising media war a consequence of abandoning the merger deal between 1+1 and 'Inter'?
– The advertising war began before the negotiations even started, in the spring of last year. The entry of Pinchuk's channels into the joint advertising program with 'Inter' influenced the start of the war. This created conditions in the advertising market that were not entirely market-oriented and allowed for '1+1' and other channels to be squeezed out.
– When the deal between SME and Rodnyansky for 1+1 is completed, will you be the main curator for 1+1 in the business in Ukraine?
– I don't think so. There is Marina Williams at CEM. Today, a new Romanian manager is overseeing Ukraine. We, for example, have regular consultations with Lauder regarding Ukraine. We met last Saturday evening, had dinner in London. He was interested in what was happening in Ukraine, where we were heading, the political situation. What's happening with Tymoshenko?
– And did you satisfy his curiosity?
– I told him that Tymoshenko, in her actions, has somewhat exceeded the bounds, on one hand, of coalition agreements, and on the other hand, of common sense.
– When was the last time you met with Tymoshenko?
– At the end of December. I asked Palitsa to help organize a meeting, I wanted to talk about the situation in the oil and gas market, to know what surprises to expect. We met in her office. We talked for about an hour. I left with the confidence that everything was in order, that there would be normal market conditions. She greeted me with a smile and saw me off with a smile.
– Let's go step by step, what do you mean she exceeded the bounds of the coalition agreement?
– For example, within the framework of the coalition agreement, the Cabinet was supposed to develop a market mechanism for purchasing gas in the Ukrainian market, regardless of its origin - Russian or Ukrainian, and simultaneously develop a system of benefits, subsidies, and subsidies for the poor. But what happened with 'Ukrnafta' now indicates that this point of the agreement has been ignored.
– I suppose your own interest speaks here, right?
– Everyone is said to have their own interests. Today, I am a major shareholder in 'Ukrnafta' [the largest oil and natural gas company in the country - eventsinukraine]. And at the time when the coalition agreement was signed, Palitsa told me that it was clearly written there: gas, regardless of where it is produced, must be sold at market prices. But today we have a different result - the National Commission for the Regulation of Energy prescribes 'Ukrnafta' to sell gas at $40 instead of $60 - while the market price is $180 per thousand cubic meters.
– How did you react to Tymoshenko's statement that 'Ukrnafta' is run by adventurers?
– We reacted extremely negatively to that.
– By the way, when Yulia Tymoshenko talks about the patrons of the 'Privat' group in state structures, I would like her not to forget to include herself in their number.
– Because it was Tymoshenko who praised us for helping to return 18% of 'Ukrtatnafta' to the state and strongly recommended returning the remaining 38% to the Tatars (Tatneft, a Russian oil and gas company based in Tartarstan). And the director of 'Ukrtatnafta,' Ovcharenko, whom she now wants to remove, Tymoshenko called 'the most experienced manager of such a large enterprise.'
– But Tymoshenko's anger is also somewhat justified. For example, the state has a controlling stake in both 'Ukrtatnafta' and 'Ukrnafta,' but cannot appoint its management...
– Why can't it? Tymoshenko claimed that allegedly there hadn't been a shareholder meeting in 'Ukrnafta' for two years. So, we sent her a letter from the shareholders, stating when the last meeting was held. It was clearly closer than two years ago.
The state is represented in the supervisory board of 'Ukrnafta' - out of 11 members, six are appointed according to Naftogaz's quota. In other words, Tymoshenko has a majority in the supervisory board.
– However, she wants to control the current management of 'Ukrnafta'!
– But the Cabinet of Ministers is not a shareholder of this company; Naftogaz [the state-owned natural gas and oil company. Yes, I know, it is all very confusing, and that is on purpose - eventsinukraine] is a shareholder. And you have to compare the results of when 'Ukrnafta' was managed by 'Naftogaz,' with the results when Igor Palitsa came there in 2003.
– Can you reveal the secret of how you constantly manage to convince representatives of the state to leave your management in 'Ukrnafta'?
– We tried to persuade Naftogaz to appoint our director for about three years - from 2000 to 2002. And finally, we succeeded. Because in 2003, there was a transitional situation, the market was unstable, the company didn’t showed very good results, there was an increase in creditors and debtors, and there were problems with gas.
– At that stage, we managed to persuade Yuriy Boyko, who was then the head of Naftogaz. At that time, he had other things to deal with - gas affairs, consortiums, and 'Ukrnafta' was essentially ownerless.
– And was it handed over to you for free?
– All taxes were paid during that time, and there was a huge profit. To show a profit, it had to be earned and accumulated. Besides taxes, dividends were paid to the state and all shareholders. From 2003 to 2007, dividends of two and a half billion hryvnias were paid!
– Many are convinced that the situation with the management of 'Ukrnafta' can only be explained by corruption on the part of 'Privat'...
– We live in Ukraine. And when corruption ratings are made, unfortunately, we find ourselves in positions that do not correspond to the capabilities of our country.
– Have you or your managers corrupted officials?
– No, we have never corrupted officials, including Boyko.
– Well, okay, but if you did, would you admit it?
– (Laughs.) It all depends on our relationship with Boyko, and we have somewhat decent ones. But I want to ask another question: is paying dividends, all taxes in full, and increasing payments to the budget corruption? You see, there is a very fine line between corruption and state interest. Because the state's interest is to collect more taxes. "Ukrnafta," for example, hardly paid any taxes when it was making a profit, but with our arrival, it started paying two, three, or five times more. So now the question is, is this corruption for the state? If it appointed a private but efficient director and started getting more money.
– Is it true that you said: "corruption is a tool to fight bureaucracy"?
– I think that's not mine. I could have used it, but I'm not its originator. I didn't come up with it.
– Do you agree with it?
– At some point, yes. If inflation is to some extent an engine of the economy, and hyperinflation is its destroyer, then corruption, perhaps, is a way to fight bureaucracy at some stage, but in the end, it leads to even greater and more terrible bureaucracy.
ABOUT YUSHCHENKO, AKHMETOV, AND TIMOSHENKO
– You say that you supported the 2004 revolution, yet you supported Timoshenko, you supported Yanukovych.
– Yes, I am satisfied with what happened in the country after the revolution, how it is developing. Perhaps not at the pace and in the way that those who stood on Maidan would have liked. I wasn't there on Maidan. Maybe people expected more, their expectations were too high.
But if we take the Ukrainian "Forbes" magazine called "Focus" today, we will see that the number of millionaires there increases from year to year. Last time we listed 130 names. But how many did we miss? I visit Dnipro [Dnepropetrovsk], Kyiv, and Western Ukraine, and I see how society is developing.
If we are trying to build Ukraine's economy based on the Western model, then, in general, we are building a consumer society. So, the main indicator of a consumer society, the consumption index, is growing in the country.
– Will you support Yushchenko in the upcoming presidential elections?
– Yes.
– What is Yushchenko's advantage over Yanukovych and Timoshenko? You are a pragmatic businessman. You should like a strong leader.
– On the contrary. I belong to the type of businessmen who understand that the economy works best when it is not interfered with. The less it is touched, the better it functions.
And the state's function should be limited to regulatory functions to prevent abuse of the possibilities offered by a market economy, cartels, and violations of antimonopoly legislation.
– In the face of the "Privat" group, you settled on Yushchenko as the most mild, loyal to you, and weak-willed in governing the state.
– I can't say that Yushchenko is very loyal to us. If we recall 2005 and the story around the Nikopol Ferroalloy Plant [a plant Kolomoisky took control of using his usual unsavoury methods], he said, "One gang was trying to replace another gang."
– Was that the only, albeit indirect, criticism of you by Yushchenko? Look at how much he criticizes the Party of Regions and everyone else!
– Yes, the Party of Regions is a business structure represented by both the party and the faction, and business circles!
I don't know of any other country in the world where such a conglomerate as the Party of Regions is possible! It's some kind of symbiosis between SCM [Systems Capital Management, Akhmetov’s business empite], the Party of Regions, UkrPodshipnik, Konti... Either they have a party, a faction, or a board of directors.
Even in Russia, there is nothing like that. Although there are more than 300 people in the United Russia faction, there is nothing like having 100 people from Rusal and 100 people from Norilsk Nickel. They can't even imagine that. But here, it's possible. (Laughs)
– Why don't you express such claims to Rinat Akhmetov during a personal meeting?
– I do express them. I had the opportunity to meet him in 2003, and I have been talking about it ever since.
– Where did you meet?
– In Grigory Surkis' office. I was there on my business, and Rinat Leonidovich came in for his own reasons.
We were in a conflict over the Central Mining and Processing Plant at the time. Grigory Mikhailovich introduced us. He said, "By the way, here is Igor Valerievich, and here is Rinat Leonidovich, let's get acquainted." We shook hands and went our separate ways.
– In the end, the Central MPC ended up in Akhmetov's hands.
– If it ended up there, it means it was rightfully so.
– Yet all the same, why do you like Yushchenko more than Yanukovych and Timoshenko? If, for instance, Timoshenko becomes president, where do you see yourself in that case?
– If Timoshenko becomes president, I see myself in emigration.
– Have you already picked a place?
– I will pick one; I still have time. (Laughs.) Although who knows, if what BYuT and the Party of Regions are doing now – eliminating the presidential post and establishing a two-party dictatorship – happens quickly, I might have much less time than I imagine.
To be continued...
Thank you 🙏 Your articles should be compulsory reading for anyone interested in Ukraine.