Pokrovsk, Syrsky, and black hawks down

Ru/kraine budget comparison. Militarists call for Azov to replace incompetent army leadership.

It’s hard to say what worries the leaders of the European Union more - that Russia won’t be invading them anytime soon, or that Ukraine is entering its second consecutive year on the retreat.

As for the Ukrainians, they have more grounded concerns. With the logistical hub of Pokrovsk fallen to the Russians all but officially over the past few days, a number of signs indicate that Zelensky is set to resort to his usual strategy - blaming army leadership.

But if he removes the hated Oleksandr Syrsky, will he heed the ever-louder chorus calling for Azov’s ‘White Fuhrer’ Andriy Biletsky and allied general Mikhailo Drapaty to take charge? Or will he shy away from such a move, given his long-standing paranoia about politically ambitious military figures?

With the spectacular failure of yesterday’s special operation to do ‘something’ in Pokrovsk, Ukrainian militarists are angrier than ever. As their fellow operators are massacred upon black hawk drop-off, they are increasingly baying for the blood of commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrsky.

Though Syrsky continues with the fiction that ‘Pokrovsk holds’, it may be that he should start worrying whether ‘Syrsky holds’.

Syrsky (speaking) at a meeting of top generals to discuss the Pokrovsk situation, November 2

Money

Let’s begin with finances, always a helpful guide to the future.

On October 22, Russia’s Duma approved the 2026-2028 budget. The budget deficit will comprise 1.6% of GDP, slightly lower than the 1.9% of the past year. This is thanks to slightly increased taxes, with revenues rising by 8.6%.

And here’s the most important part - military spending will fall by 4.2%, from $147 billion USD in 2025 to $137 billion in 2026 (the Economist reports $160 billion for 2025). Total expenditure will only rise by 3%. Military spending will account for 29% of all spending, and another 9% for domestic law enforcement. Spending on the latter category will rise by 13% compared to 2025.

In other words, don’t expect any grand armored assaults over the next few years in Ukraine - let alone Europe.

Russia is betting on attrition - as it always had, from Napoleon to Hitler. The finance minister was clear that military spending will be dedicated to maintaining and improving the existing Russian army, not radically expanding it:

[spending will be allocated to] combating drones, strengthening the security of transport infrastructure, increasing the security of border and new regions, including staffing units of all our law enforcement agencies

The Carnegie Endowment put out an article on the budget, but it soon deleted it. I assume that it was judged insufficiently ‘optimistic’ about the likelihood of Russian tanks breaking into Berlin. The article, whose archived version can be read here, notes that the largest increases in military spending are for salaries and reserve contributions. Meanwhile, procurement and capital expenditure will remain at essentially the same level, likely indicating a shift from investment to serial production.

The Russian leadership, in other words, is quite confident that the current tempos of military operations will be enough to break down Ukraine. Higher levels of military investment and action are seen as not worth the potential economic and social costs.

Things are quite different for Ukraine. Military expenditure is through the roof, but the results on there.

The Economist published an article on October 31 desperately trying to maintain optimism about the situation, with the following, positively Freudian title:

Why funding Ukraine is a giant opportunity for Europe

The bill will be huge. It is also a historic bargain

In it, the authors note that the total cost off Ukraine’s defense budget and foreign military aid from 2022 until 2025 will have have been $360 billion USD.

For reference, Ukraine’s pre-2022 GDP never reached $200 billion USD.

In 2025, Ukraine will have spent between $100 and 110 billion, the highest sum so far. By comparison, Russia will have spent around $150 billion on the army over the course of 2025.

But unlike Ukraine, it is moving forward. According to Ukraine’s DeepState, which is now known for its underestimates of Russian progression, the Russian army has taken control of 3,386 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory in the first 10 months of 2025. That is already slightly more than the entirety of 2024, and does not include the ~1000 square kilometers Ukraine had taken in Russia’s Kursk oblast in late 2024, freed by the Russian army in the first few months of the year.

Where Ukraine’s military spending comprises half of its GDP, Russia’s defense and security spending only made up under 8% of GDP in 2025, and is set to stay at that level over the next two years.

Where Russia’s budget revenue comes mainly from domestic taxes, Ukraine’s public debt has doubled as a share of GDP since 2022, now standing at 110%. Where Russia’s fiscal deficit is under 2% of GDP, Ukraine’s is close to 20%.

Ukraine’s 2026 budget is set to have expenditures at almost twice the level of revenues. All tax revenues will be spent on the army. All non-military spending is set to come from foreign aid.

Where Ukraine’s budget is totally dependent on western assistance, Russia’s relies on domestic resources. With the Economist reporting that Donald Trump’s USA ceased its monthly financial contributions to Ukraine in February, the pressure is on the Europeans to pay up.

Spending decisions

It’s not quite clear where all the money has been going.

Some of the priorities raise questions. Yesterday, it emerged that the Ukrainian government is spending almost $50,000 USD on the production of a film dedicated to Ukraine’s 2024 Kursk offensive. The idea is doubtless to convince the westerners that the plucky Ukrainians must be supported to conduct another such ‘daring operation’. I wonder how the film plans to treat the fact that all territories in Kursk taken by Ukraine were lost within a few months at the cost of thousands of Ukrainian lives.

Even when it comes to weapon spending, not everyone is convinced. I’ve reported at length on the never-ending revelations that Zelensky’s beloved, western-funded ‘Flamingo’ wunderwaffen are a scam. Last week, even the New York Times belatedly reported on the scandals surrounding the company producing the Flamingo, though it shied away from questioning the hype around the missiles themselves.

Tik Tok addiction

Whether the Flamingo flies or not, it hasn’t helped the frontlines. Over the course of the past week, the city Pokrovsk has fallen to Russian forces in all but name.

It is unclear whether things really accelerated so rapidly over the past few days, or if this was simply a belated half-admission of reality by Ukrainian high command. Some, like the military telegram ‘Thoughts of a Frontliner’, believe that the latter was true:

Ukrainian military analysts have long criticized high command’s proclivity towards lying about the true state of affairs. This accusation was proven once again on October 27. Valentin Manko is the ex-con I wrote about here who Syrsky recently made head of his ‘personal guard’ of ‘Assault Forces’.

Manko published some ‘entertaining’ photographs of high command’s maps to Tik Tok:

Ukraine’s most popular blogger, the lib-nazi Serhiy Sternenko, called on his hordes of followers to attack Mr Manko. Ukraine’s main OSINT resource DeepState soon reported that Manko’s map was marked top secret. Just about ever top military figure expressed their outrage that such an unprofessional figure had been given such authority.

The problem went deeper. Another Ukrainian OSINT group noted that Manko’s map showed Ukrainian positions that were up to 9 kilometers ahead of what DeepState reported. DeepState confirmed it, complaining that Ukrainian high command systematically commands subordinates to hold positions long ago lost, and never gives the order to retreat until far too late.

Manko decided to respond to the criticism by posting a close-up photo of the same map.

Syrsky made a show of obliquely responding to criticism by stating on the 26th that lies by commanders on the realities of the frontline would be harshly punished. Of course.

For his part, Manko has quite a specific form of responding to criticism.

On October 22, pro-Zelensky, anti-Syrsky MP Mariana Bezuhla compared Manko to Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov.

In response to the red-haired critic, Manko gave a spirited intellectual defense:

Other top military telegrams, like ‘Complaint by Recon’, continue impotently whining about Manko’s Tik Tok addiction:

There was also a scandal on the 20th when top Azov commander Bohdan Krotevych uncovered Manko instagram stories of him dancing to Russian music.

Even worse, Manko also posted tiktok edits of ‘which character you would be in the Word of a Boy’. This is a very popular Russian television show released last year. Though just about every Ukrainian watched it eagerly, admitting to have done so is criticized by patriots.

Not the most interesting scandals, but Ukrainian militarists, particularly those more liberal-aligned (like Krotevych), found it very important. In any case, the important thing is that Manko’s patronage by/friendship with Syrsky clearly protects him from all criticism.

Besides, he isn’t just posting secret maps and dancing to the wrong songs - his assault forces are also renowned for their willingness to expend personnel in pointless suicide missions.

Pokrovsk holds?

Let’s now move onto the frontline - the fall of the crucial city of Pokrovsk, the catastrophic failure of yesterday’s triple black hawk mission into the city, and increasing calls to replace incompetent military leadership with Azov ultra-nationalists. How many Ukrainian troops are responsible? Who and what is to blame?

To begin with the last question. Syrsky’s condemnation of lies doesn’t seem to extend to himself. He announced on November 2 that Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad are still not surrounded: ‘Pokrovsk - holding. Myrnohrad - holding.’

For comparison, the liberal nationalist publication Hromadske reported the testimony of an anonymous Ukrainian ‘high-ranking officer’ near Pokrovsk on October 31 - he stated that 60% of Pokrovsk is already under Russian control.

The hellish reality experienced by Ukrainian troops remaining in the Pokrovsk area was best expressed by the following video, shared by many Ukrainian military telegrams on November 1:

But back to the unfolding of events in Pokrovsk over the past few days. Hromadske’s military interlocutor criticized the DeepState map, stating that all territories marked as ‘grey’ (controlled by neither side) should be marked at ‘red’ (controlled by Russia).

Already on October 31, Hromadske painted a very grim picture:

“Those who are in the front lines in Pokrovsk are basically surrounded, with little chance of escaping. There are houses, neighborhoods, and streets that it is almost impossible to walk through without being shot,” warns the aforementioned pilot.

The first Russian infiltration into the city occurred in July. Since then, Russian forces have been entering the city through ever new holes in Ukraine’s sparcely-manned defenses. And on October 24, Ukrainska Pravda reported that a new set of Russians had entered the city:

Direct speech of the first interlocutor:
“The infantry is practically cut off from command. We can hear them (over the radio), we try to drop them some water — people have been holding positions for 2.5 to 3 months. For our brigade, that’s a long time, since we always tried to carry out rotations. In Pokrovsk itself, from what I know, there are 250 faggots — in reality, I think the number is even higher. There’s fighting on almost every street — every day we have KIA and WIA.”

Direct speech of the second interlocutor:
“Things continue to develop according to the worst-case scenario. Pokrovsk is collapsing far too quickly — we didn’t expect this. In the north of Myrnohrad there are some faggots — in the south, small groups are infiltrating, but overall the situation is better than in Pokrovsk.

But if Pokrovsk falls, there will be no way out for the garrison in Myrnohrad. Our supply route to Myrnohrad is over 20 kilometers long. It’s almost impossible to rotate the troops. It’s impossible to evacuate those who are down. Rodynske is being pressed (by the Russians), and Chervonyi Lyman is controlled by the faggots. People are working at their limit, fully aware that encirclement is getting closer.”

Hromadske’s sources believed that Ukrainska Pravda’s figure of 250 infiltrators was an underestimate. Indeed, at this point it seems much more like the city is under control of conventional Russian units, not simply ‘infiltrators’.

Pokrovsk

The infiltrators certainly do exist at the forward lines, of course, and Hromadske’s sources report that they are bypassing the few Ukrainian infantry troops to kill drone operators: