Prospects for guaranteeing the military campaign of 2023: the Ukrainian view
Valery Zaluzhnyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General, member of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Mykhailo Zabrodsky, First Deputy Chairman of the Committe
09/07/2022
Eventsinukraine translator’s note - this article was published in early September on the Ukrainian government site Ukrinform - you can access the Ukrainian language original here. It was written by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and a politician from Poroshenko’s ‘European Solidarity’ Party.
Some highlights -
Crimea is a crucial centre of gravity for the Russian military campaign and Ukraine must focus on taking control of Crimea.
Territorial wins for Ukraine, even taking Crimea, will not be decisive in ending the war. The only way to bring an end to the war is by ‘showing Russian society the costs of war’ through long range missile systems which can hit targets thousands of kilometers within Russia. At the moment Ukraine can only hit targets 100km within Russia and the west has not been willing to give longer range missile systems.
This article features the first official statement claiming responsibility for rocket attacks on Crimea
‘It is also impossible to completely rule out the possibility of direct involvement of the world's leading countries in a "limited" nuclear conflict, in which the prospect of a Third World War is already directly visible… Any attempts at practical steps towards the use of tactical nuclear weapons must be stopped using the entire arsenal of means at the disposal of the countries of the world.’
Ukraine should begin producing its own missile and other armaments systems. This also opens up opportunities for cooperation with partner countries.
Cooperation of the Army Chief in writing this article with a deputy from Poroshenko’s party is notable, given the critical position of politicians in that party towards the Zelensky government, whom they accuse of inadequately preparing for the war.
How long this war could last and how we can win it
Currently, the absolute majority of military experts and analysts do not consider the large-scale war unleashed by the Russian Federation against Ukraine on February 24, 2022 to be a local conflict of medium intensity. This is due to spatial indicators and the quantity of military forces involved, as well as the impressive list of means of destruction and other high-tech equipment which are inherent to this military struggle.
HOW LONG WILL THE WAR LAST?
The issue of the duration of the said conflict is separate. After all, in no way does it fit either into the framework of the "blitzkrieg" announced by Russia or into the duration of the active phases of hostilities in the wars of the beginning of the 21st century. In any case, the duration of the war is already measured in months. And there is every reason to believe that this time count will cross the calendar boundaries of 2022.
In this regard, it is natural to consider the prospects for next year. And to do it not only in the format of predictions and assumptions. Such consideration should aim at a completely practical analysis. Namely, how far should the military ambitions of the Ukrainian side extend? And a logical derivative of this question: what exactly do the Armed Forces of Ukraine need in terms of help from partners for the coming year, 2023?
It is quite logical that the search for answers to these questions, in addition to fascinating theoretical discussions, also has a completely utilitarian side. For a limited number of military and civilian officials, such research is a leading part of their professional duties. It is worth adding that for most of them, such issues are essentially a clearly expressed responsibility for the defense of the country, and, ultimately, for its fate.
It can be assumed that these studies have already been reflected in a number of state-level guiding and doctrinal documents. For obvious reasons, their research is not within the scope of this article. This article suggests only to consider the main evaluative judgments in relation to the mentioned questions and to propose one's own version of answers to them.
Given the strategic initiative of the aggressor, it is quite logical to begin with a description of a situation in which the Russian side will probably still be there. Delineation of the conflict lines already makes it possible to predict the limits of the Russian Federation's ambitions for further advancement into the territory of Ukraine.
HOW CAN THE AGGRESSOR FURTHER SEE HIS GOAL?
Certain operational prospects for the enemy can be seen in the Izyum and Bakhmut directions. Access to the administrative border of Donetsk region can be considered as the probable ultimate goal of such actions. The prospect of advancing in the Zaporizhye direction may look even more attractive to the enemy. It ensures further actions to the north and the creation of a direct threat of taking over Zaporizhzhia and the city of Dnipro, which in turn will lead to the Ukrainian side losing control over a large part of Left Bank Ukraine. A return to the plan to seize Kyiv is not excluded from the agenda and the threat of renewed hostilities from the territory of the Republic of Belarus.
But further advancement in the direction south of the river Bug from the operational bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnipro River opens up the most opportunities. Success in the South, provided it is used quickly and faithfully, can have a double effect. On the one hand, the prospects of mastering Mykolaiv and Odesa are quite real. On the other hand, the creation of a threatening direction towards Kryvyi Rih, and in the future - a threat to the central and western regions of Ukraine.
We will deliberately not refer to the conditions under which the Russian Federation will be forced to implement such a possible plan. At the same time, we will not ignore the entire range of related strategic and even global problems for the Russian Federation. We can mention international isolation and partial economic pressure in the form of international sanctions, difficulties with general mobilization and the lack of modern weapons and equipment, which will only become more acute with time.
In addition to the purely military, this nature of strategic actions in the East and South of Ukraine will bring the Russian Federation additional political and economic dividends. Among them are ensuring the security of the self-proclaimed republics and the logical, albeit belated completion of the so-called "special operation", preventing Ukraine's access to the Black Sea, control over a key element of the country's energy system - the South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant, etc.
WHY IS CRIMEA A KEY FACTOR, BUT NOT THE ONLY ONE?
It is easy to come to the conclusion that the basis of such promising success in the South and, to some extent, in the East, in the territorial sense, is reliable defense and preservation of control over the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Indeed, Crimea was and remains the basis for lines of communication on the southern strategic flank of Russian aggression. The territory of the peninsula allows for the deployment of significant groups of troops and supplies of material resources. Finally, Crimea is home to the main base of the Black Sea Fleet and a network of airfields for conducting airstrikes on almost the entire depth of the territory of Ukraine. Some analysts are inclined to believe that it is control over the territory of the Crimean peninsula that is the center of attraction for Russian forces in this war.
However, when addressing the situation in which the Armed Forces of Ukraine will probably find themselves in 2023, everything doesn't seem so unambiguous anymore. In fact, for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the situation will represent a complex combination of the existing position of the contact line, the available resources and the set of combat-ready troops, and, obviously, finding the strategic initiative in the hands of the enemy.
At the same time, continuing this logic, we will express strong reservations about the formation of the contact line from the point of view of the Ukrainian side. Its contours have an extremely unfavorable configuration again in the Izyum and Bakhmut directions. The enemy's significant wedges constrain any operational maneuver for the Ukrainian troops and require, in fact, a double set of forces to contain it. This is especially acutely felt due to the lack of means of artillery/rocket systems and anti-aircraft defense.
The situation in the South and East does not look better either. The threat of enemy advance in the direction of Zaporizhzhia has already been mentioned. In addition, the danger of the enemy developing a partial success from the Gulyai Pole direction does not disappear, which, under certain conditions, could create a threat of encircling the entire group of Ukrainian troops in the East. The presence of the enemy's operational bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnipro River requires additional efforts to prevent its expansion.
COUNTER ATTACKS BY THE UKRAINIAN ARMY: WHAT IS NEEDED FOR THIS?
The only way to radically change the strategic situation is, without a doubt, to launch several consecutive, and ideally simultaneous counterattacks by the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the 2023 campaign. It is unnecessary to emphasize separately their purely military and their political and informational significance. At the same time, the issue of their organization and implementation needs more attention.
So, what forces and means are needed for this? If we consider the 2023 campaign as a turning point, then for consideration we need to return to the identification of the center of gravity for the Russian Federation in this war. After all, only an effective influence on the enemy's center of gravity can lead to changes in the course of the war.
Provided that such a center of gravity is defined as control over the Crimean peninsula, it is logical to assume planning for 2023 an operation or a series of operations to seize the peninsula. Such planning should provide, first of all, for the availability of the necessary set of troops. And we are not talking about military units and formations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which are already operating on the 2,500 km front from Kherson to Kovel.
The preparation of an offensive campaign requires the creation of one or more operational (operational-strategic) formations consisting of ten to twenty combined military brigades - depending on the plans and ambitions of the Ukrainian command. In the situation that is forming, the aforementioned can only be executed by replacing the main types of weapons used by already existing brigades with modern ones provided by Ukraine's partners. Separately, the need to obtain from partners an additional number of missiles and ammunition, artillery systems, missile systems, means of electronic warfare, etc. should be highlighted. All this will require the consolidation of efforts of all partner countries of Ukraine, over a long time period and involving significant financial expenses.
Strictly speaking, all of the above directly depends on the available resources and only on them. And if the situation with the number of personnel will probably look quite good for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the same cannot be said about heavy weapons and ammunition. But, in any case, in the presence of political will, prior and well-thought-out planning, using the production base and reserves of the leading countries of the world, the creation and proper equipment of such a group as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is absolutely realistic.
But the outlined approach to defining the tasks of the 2023 military campaign for the Armed Forces of Ukraine seems too one-sided.
IF THE INVADER EVEN LOSES CRIMEA
So, we are once again forced to return to the identification of the center of gravity of the enemy by the Ukrainian side. Let's leave aside the legitimacy of linking the concept of "center of gravity" to a certain area or region at a strategic level. Note only that that it is the source of moral and physical power, strength and resistance - what Clausewitz called "the concentration of all power and movement on which everything depends..., the point on which all our energy should be directed" [1] . Let's assume that the Armed Forces of Ukraine achieved complete success in the 2023 campaign and took control of the Crimean peninsula.
It is difficult to overestimate the extremely positive political and informational significance of such a strategic success. However, the military significance of such a victory can be assessed in a different way. The Russian Federation loses a base for the Black Sea Fleet, an airfield network, a significant amount of stockpiles of material resources and, most likely, a significant amount of personnel and equipment. Simultaneously, nothing can significantly prevent the painful but quite possible transfer of the Black Sea Fleet to the Novorossiysk naval base on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, and the military presence of the aggressor in the region will be maintained along with the threat of missile strikes. The same can be assumed for Russian aviation, for example, the Primorsko-Akhtarsk airfields and Yeisk. The loss of a significant amount of supplies for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will have only a temporary effect. Losses in personnel and equipment, at least in terms of numbers, the Russians can make up over time.
Summarizing what has been said and discussing further prospects, after 2023, we can only talk about a new stage of confrontation. Of course, with different initial data and perspectives, but again - an ongoing conflict, loss of life, consumption of resources and a completely uncertain end result.
A slightly different approach to determining the center of gravity of Russian forces and the very essence of this war is proposed.
DISPROPORTION IN CAPABILITIES OF UKRAINE AND RUSSIA: HOW TO LEVEL IT?
The main feature of the military confrontation with the Russian Armed Forces is not even a significant difference in the number of forces and means of the parties in favor of the Russians, and not even significant spatial indicators of the strategic operation against Ukraine. Determinant is the decisive disproportion in capabilities .
Its most revealing embodiment is the difference in the ultimate reach of the means of destruction. If for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation it is up to 2,000 km, taking into account the flight range of air-based cruise missiles [2] , then for the Armed Forces of Ukraine it is actually limited to 100 km by the flight range of the missiles and the depth of the location of the starting positions of the outdated OTRK Tochku Missile [3] . Thus, since the beginning of the large-scale aggression, the means of destruction of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have a range almost 20 times smaller than that of the enemy. Translated into the language of military practice, this means that the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in the best case, can strike with outdated means of attack only at the depth of the enemy's operational rear. While the enemy is capable of inflicting pinpoint strikes on targets with impunity to the entire depth of the territory of the country.
This should be considered as the center of gravity of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from a military point of view. As long as this situation is maintained, this war could last for years.
How to fix this?
Of course, it is impossible to instantly deprive the enemy of such a significant advantage. Considering the number and availability of resources at the disposal of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the very possibility of eliminating it completely is doubtful. But it is quite possible to oppose the enemy's ability to act in a similar way and at a similar range.
We are talking, of course, about the supply of weapons systems or certain types of ammunition with the appropriate range by Ukraine's partners to the Armed Forces. This means not only and not so much certain names, such as, for example, the MGM - 140 B missile ATACMS Block 1 A for the Himars MLRS . A comprehensive approach to the re-equipment of artillery, missile forces, tactical aviation and the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other components of their power must be applied. The discussion should be about the creation or expansion of capabilities, and not exclusively about the amount of weapons and equipment for brigades that are planned for re-equipment.
Only in this case it is possible to discuss how to influence the real center of gravity of the Russian Federation in this war. It lies in its "remote" - in the understanding of most Russians - character. Thanks to this distance, the citizens of the Russian Federation do not so painfully perceive losses, failures, and most importantly - the cost of this war in all its meanings. A convincing example of the correctness of this approach in the current year is the successful efforts of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to physically transfer hostilities to the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. We are talking about a series of successful missile strikes on the enemy's Crimean air bases, first of all, on the Saka airfield [4] . The task of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2023 is to make these feelings sharper, more natural and tangible for Russians and those in other occupied territories, despite their significant distance from the goals.
It's worthwhile putting the question even more broadly and ask oneself: what is the source of the confidence, readiness, and most importantly - necessity for the leadership of the Russian Federation and Russian society to support the war against Ukraine and sincerely believe in the correctness of its completion?
Apart from well-known reasons such as the desire for at least regional leadership, various kind of "getting up from our knees" and openly imperial encroachments, which are also acceptable for average Russian , there are purely practical reasons. It refers precisely to the principles of the use of military force by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. It is expressed in an aggressive style of a war of destruction against a state which, given the level of equipment of its armed forces, will not be able to adequately act against Russian troops in response. Simply put, it is precisely the impunity that physical distance provides. This is the true center of gravity of the enemy. And we have no right to leave it without proper attention.
The picture could radically change with appropriate planning and proper work with Ukraine's partner countries. A comprehensive, with a proper long-term vision, equipping and re-equipping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with weapon systems of the appropriate range should become this dreamed-of game-changer. Only if the balance is equalized in terms of the reach of the means of destruction and, thus, the specified center of gravity of the enemy is shaken, is it possible to talk about a turning point in the course of the war.
It is obvious that operational and strategic perspectives for 2023 for Ukraine in the case of obtaining the appropriate funds will look very different than it does today. The presence of even the very threat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces using means of destruction of the appropriate range will force the Russian Federation to consider the nature, course, and outcome of our confrontation in a different way.
However, the acquisition of relevant weapons systems from partners can be considered by Ukraine only as a solution for the transition period. From the first days of the large-scale aggression of the Russian Federation, the Ukrainian side has faced a pressing problem of the restoration and securement of its own design and production of high-tech weapons. And the tactical and technical requirements for such weapons should already include appropriate parameters, in particular, regarding the range of application. There is no doubt that Ukraine's national efforts in this direction open up unlimited opportunities for international military-technical cooperation with partner countries.
THE BASIS OF UKRAINIAN RESISTANCE - SIGNIFICANT MILITARY AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM PARTNERS
Considering the prospects of cooperation with partners in the supply of weapons to Ukraine, it is expedient to consider two essential factors, which already from the very beginning of the aggression have a considerable influence on the taking of relevant decisions and on the terms and volumes of assistance.
The first of them is a misconception about the scale of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Despite a sufficient amount of widely available information, it is difficult for the modern generation, the world, and Europeans, first of all, to imagine combat operations in the style of World War II in reality. The line of contact is thousands of kilometers long, there are tens of thousands of units of military equipment, more than a million people are directly or indirectly participating in this war with weapons in their hands. Air raid sirens and rocket-bomb attacks on civilian cities, refugees and prisoners of war, river crossings and tank breakthrough attempts - all this for the absolute majority of people in the world remains only a ghostly reality of the world wars of the last century.
Simultaneously, for the people and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, all of the above has already become an integral part of everyday life. In terms of the involvement of personnel and equipment, Ukraine's resistance to Russian aggression has already exceeded certain indicators of combat operations on its territory during the Second World War. The deployment of effective resistance to the more than 300,000-strong group of the Russian Armed Forces required the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of people to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and their equipping with tens of thousands of items of military equipment. And the daily expenditure of ammunition by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, for example, artillery shells per gun, on average, exceeds three times the indicators of the Royal Artillery of the British Army during the First World War. Taking into account the duration of the war and the prospects for the 2023 campaign, it is unlikely that these indicators will decrease.
Ukraine's repulsion of aggression by a superpower requires and will require significant material resources and financial costs for a long time to come. In 2023, the material basis of the Ukrainian resistance should remain significant in terms of military and technical assistance from partner countries. After all, despite its own losses from economic sanctions, dependence on Russian energy sources and individual attempts to "pacify" the Russian Federation, world history will not forgive any country in the world for conniving with a bloody predator that only gets drunk on new blood.
The second factor is the direct threat of the use, under certain circumstances, of tactical nuclear weapons by the Russian Armed Forces. Combat actions on the territory of Ukraine have already demonstrated how much the Russian Federation neglects the issues of global nuclear security even in a war with the use of conventional means [5] . In particular, from July 2022, Russian troops have been on the territory of the Zaporizhzhya NPP, transformed into a military base , placing heavy artillery there, in particular, reactive systems of salvo fire BM-30 " Smerch " [6] .
It is hard to imagine that even nuclear strikes will allow the Russian Federation to break Ukraine's will to resist. But the threat that will appear for the whole of Europe cannot be ignored. It is also impossible to completely rule out the possibility of direct involvement of the world's leading countries in a "limited" nuclear conflict, in which the prospect of a Third World War is already directly visible.
One is once again forced, though it is extremely necessary, to return to the source of Russian confidence, or rather, its impunity. Any attempts at practical steps towards the use of tactical nuclear weapons must be stopped using the entire arsenal of means at the disposal of the countries of the world. After all, starting from this moment, the Russian Federation will become not only a threat to the peaceful coexistence of Ukraine, its other neighbors and a number of European countries, but also a truly global terrorist state.
In our opinion, it is precisely with such a complex and ambiguous combination of factors in mind that the prospects of the 2023 military campaign should be considered. Only their full and complex consideration will create the prerequisites for Ukraine's task of defeating the armed forces of the aggressor country and ending the destructive war within Europe.
[1] Wade, N. (2009). The Joint Forces Operations and Doctrine (2nd ed .). Lakeland , FL : The Lightning Press .
[2] First of all, the KRPB Kh-55/Kh-505 and Kh-101.
[3] Modernized missile complex 9K79-1 "Point-U" began to enter the army in 1989. OTRK "Tochka-U" has a declared range of up to 120 km and circular probable deviation up to 95 m.
[4] The airfield of the permanent base of the 43rd Marine Assault Aviation Regiment of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy. One of the five main airfields on the territory of the Crimean peninsula, which the Russian aviation has been using since February 2022 for strikes on the territory of Ukraine. As a result of a combined strike on the airfield on August 9, 2022, up to 10 Russian Su-24 and Su-30M aircraft were destroyed.
[5] The Chernobyl nuclear power plant was under the control of Russian troops from February 24 to April 2, 2022. The Zaporizhia NPP has been under the control of Russian troops since March 4, 2022.
[6] Hinshaw D., Parkinson J. ( 2022, July 5). Russian Army Turns Ukraine's Largest Nuclear Plant Into a Military Base . The Wall Street Journal.