The battlefield of 2026
Winter pause for spring assaults. Drone innovations and frontline analysis from five key theaters.
What’s been happening on the frontlines?
It’s more important than ever to demonstrate some victories. Ukraine’s last remaining financial aid from the EU is both insufficient and being held up. Trump seems to have removed some energy sanctions from Russia because of inflation caused by his Iran war, and he isn’t likely to return direct US arms shipments to Ukraine anytime soon.
As such, Ukrainian media and military-political leaders have focused on several claims. The first, of course, is that they are slaughtering industrial numbers of Russian troops, supposedly more than are recruited. Second, that Russian forces apparently took less territory in February 2026 than ever before since July 2025. Third, that Ukrainian troops, fresh off February’s ‘victories’ in the southern Zaporizhzhia oblast, have just ‘liberated 450 square kilometers’ slightly north, at the intersection of the Zaporizhzhia, Dnepropetrovsk, and Donetsk oblasts.
Ukrainian troops and military analysts have presented criticisms of all three claims. Their arguments are the topic of today’s 5,000 word article. First, I will explain them in their basic form.
First, Russian losses. The system used to calculate these losses, namely reconnaissance drones that record Ukrainian strike drones, has a tendency towards exaggeration. This is because recorded destruction of Russian infantry resulted in discounts for drones on the government drone marketplace. As a result, journalists have reported seeing two units claim points for the same Russian infantryman — one drone wounded him, another killed him. Or perhaps he wasn’t wounded at all, and the drone simply exploded next to him.
Apart from the actual numbers, there are broader strategic problems. This focus on infantry has neglected targeting Russia’s increasingly effective drone operators. Furthermore, targeting infantry, though necessary due to the scarcity of Ukrainian troops, means that Ukrainian drone operators neglect focusing on creating ‘kill zones’ behind Russian lines. Bare defense is all that is possible.
Second, territory taken. This winter was exceptionally cold and snowy. This means no tree cover for advancing infantry, and a number of weather problems for drones. The last winter was significantly warmer. As the weather warms up, all agree that Russian advances will too. Most point to April as the month in which this factor will return. Other analysts have pointed to drastically lower recorded Russian armored losses over the past 3 months as evidence that significant assault operations have taken a pause in preparation for better conditions in the spring and summer.
Besides, the fact that comparatively less Ukrainian territory was taken may hide the fact that more scarce Ukrainian troops were lost in its active defense and counterattack operations. A number of our military reporters and frontline fighters translated today described serious Ukrainian losses.
Third, the second ‘counteroffensive’ in the south. In fact, no one serious is calling it a counteroffensive. Even Zelensky, after a confused pause on how to call it, described the latest operations in the Dnepropetrovsk oblast ‘counterattacks’.
The entire south, both the Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, are under-fortified, undermanned farmlands with less urban structures or forested areas than further north. This makes it difficult to hold territory, but also quite easy to mount dramatic expeditions into territory ‘controlled’ by the enemy. This is true for both sides.
This means that the same territory here is often ‘controlled’ by both, but this merely means that both forces have troops occasionally present in these locations. This phenomenon is described as ‘the grey zone’. And though Ukrainian forces have pushed forward into sections of the grey zone that their infantry has kept away from over the past few months, Russian troops continue moving forward in the very same areas. It is also unclear just how long Ukraine’s undermanned units will be able to hold onto these territories, a fact that many of today’s military bloggers highlight.
The difficulty in identifying what territory is actually controlled by whom makes claims about grand counteroffensives dubious. More sober Ukrainian journalists and military analysts believe that the president’s claims of 400 square kilometers or more retaken is a massive overestimate, with the real figure under 100, and all territory that is still being fought over.
More importantly, the south doesn’t carry the same political significance as the Donetsk oblast further north. Control of the Donetsk region has always been Russia’s main declared territorial goal. Operations in the south are highly threatening due to the enormous economic and political importance of massive cities like Zaporizhzhia and Dnepropetrovsk. Nevertheless, today’s Ukrainian reports indicate that Russia’s attention, in terms of troops and elite drone operators, has been mainly focused on the Donbass.
Now, today’s topics.
— The main battles and dangers for the Ukrainians in 2026.
— Over-estimated Russian losses, and lowered payouts for missing and killed in action Ukrainian troops
— Drones. Russia’s crack ‘Rubikon’ drone team has no analogue in Ukraine, Ukraine’s drone operators focus too much on killing infantry instead of destroying enemy operators and ruining logistics, as Russia does. The latter has apparently increased the number of drones used at the front by five to six times compared to 2026. Other drone innovations, and the issues caused to Ukrainian drone operators by China increasing the price of fiber optic cable.
— Detailed analysis of the Guliaipole, Oleksandrivka, Pokvrovsk, Kramatorsk and Konstantynivka frontlines over the past two weeks.
