The scheme is simple and vile

Military organization: lackluster results of the corps reform. Azov's conflict with army command. Desertion and corruption. No more training bases. Reassessment of the failed 2023 counteroffensive.

The guys in the reserve battalions have been rotting in limbo for over half a year now — waiting to be “transferred” into new brigades.

The scheme is simple and vile: pay “a couple thousand” — and you get permission to slip away home “for the weekend.”

Quietly, without any publicity, in the finest of traditions.

People are fighting, while others are cashing in on bureaucratic swamp muck. It’s sickening.

Today’s topic is the human material making up the Ukrainian army. Namely, its organization. Tomorrow I’ll put out an article on mobilization and the type of personnel it has been supplying.

Much of today’s article will analyze Ukraine’s much-hyped corps reform, announced at the start of this year. Beginning with an explanation of the aims of the reform, we will move onto some analysis by military bloggers from the past month on its mixed results. Finally, we’ll take a look at the 17 corps that currently exist, and pry open some details about the commanders in charge. Not all of them live up the reputation of ‘young effective commanders’. This whole topic is also relevant to understanding the neo-nazi Azov network’s ascent in army ranks.

Last week, we looked at how incompetent new units are buckling at the frontline. But another issue covered today is that of personnel trying to enter different units to escape abusive commanders. According to some recent reports by military bloggers, attempts to encourage this have been stymied by systemic corruption.

Meanwhile, training centers have other problems. On the one hand, constant Russian military strikes against them have meant that commanders are now complaining that their men aren’t getting any training at all. On the other hand, some complain that training officers are only appointed through bribery and have no real frontline experience.

Finally, history and military intrigues. Head of the army Syrsky’s repression of the popular commander of the 46th, a unit fighting in the crucial area where the Donetsk Oblast borders with the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Next, a pro-Syrsky reassessment of supposed missed chances in the 2023 counter-offensive, and Azov leader Biletsky’s conflict with Syrsky during said counter-offensive, with the ‘white fuhrer’ supposedly saved by president Zelensky.

By the way, a note to my readers. This week, I’ve decided to conduct a little experiment and take leave off my day job to focus on my substack. As a result, I’ll be putting out an article every day, as well as finally release some content I’ve been promising for some time. If you’d like this experiment to continue, consider becoming a paid subscriber.