The Slavyansk pincers
Grand Donbass offensive? Azov and Drones overhyped? Criticism of e-point system. Fewer Russian losses.
Back to the war today.
However, there won’t be as much focus on drones as usual - in fact, we’ll even take a look at a recent article by a Ukrainian soldier arguing that the army has over-emphasized drone warfare for PR purposes. But fear not, droners, you will be able to identify plenty of common threads in today’s roundup of Ukrainian analysis - the use of mothership drones to extend the range of FPV drones, and the insufficient attention by Ukrainian command to targeting Russian elite drone units, for instance.
We’ll also examine criticism of the drone ‘point’ system, which numerous military sources have blamed for an overemphasis on strategically meaningless attacks on infantry. Our military analysts also worry that the system, which supplies drones to units with more documented kills, encourages harmful inequality in the army, leading to weak units that easily fold under pressure.
Also analyzed is the state of the battlefield over the course of August, including the number of Russian assaults and territory lost. Of particular interest are recent worries by Ukrainian analysts about official statistics showing that Russian troops have been taking fewer casualties while advancing more quickly.
Next, the so-called Slavyansk pincers. We take a look at recent Ukrainian analysis on the possible Russian attempt to take the Donbass in a vast pincer movement. This will move us onto an examination of recent long-distance Russian drone strikes - the war is being decided by control over logistical routes.
And of course, we will end by looking at the actual state of affairs at key hotpoints on the frontline - Dobropillia, Kupiansk, Lyman, and elsewhere. Of particular note is the fact that the supposedly elite Azov is retreating around Lyman. The breakdown of various Ukrainian army corps, their area of responsibility, and the quality of their troops is also relevant, particularly in the context of the much-heralded Corps reform.
Highlights:
Unfortunately, the army is now led by commanders who are accustomed to covering their professional incompetence with human losses.
What is recorded in reports as “insignificant” (a few sabotage-reconnaissance groups passed through) is actually a problem if you have a large stretch of the front controlled by observation posts (OPs) manned by only two or three people.
We used to laugh at the Russian army’s anti-drone training. But it has had an effect—from drills on camouflage to learning how to evade drone-dropped munitions and how to counter FPV drones.
We long mocked motorcycle assaults, but now Ukraine has begun using them as well.
In basic military training, we often don’t take into account the full realities of modern war. Soldiers are taught to fight as in 2022, when the priority was to dig in quickly
The Russians have quasi research institutes experimenting with FPV drones, creating models more resistant to electronic warfare (EW). Ukraine has this too, but at the state level the work is less systematic.
Given that China supports Russia, their technological advantage will continue to grow. You can immediately feel it when enemy units like “Rubikon” or “Judgment Day” arrive in a sector.
