Yermak down?
Zelensky surrounded. Peace conspiracy? Zaluzhny's intervention. Azovites tired of fake opposition.
Is the Yermak era really over?
Andriy Borisovich Yermak has centralized power ever since his February 2020 appointment to head of Zelensky’s Office of the President. But on November 29, Zelensky finally announced his resignation, following a November 28 raid on Yermak’s residence at the President’s Office by the NABU (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine).

Over the past 70 months, Yermak has been crafted into the bete noire of Ukrainian politics. His greatest enemies are the western press and their liberal nationalist subcontractors in Ukraine.
Whenever a ‘young reformer’ (read: lab-grown neoliberal) was fired, Yermak was to blame. Whenever Ukraine seemed about to agree to a ‘capitulation’ (read: peace) with Russia, Yermak was the FSB fifth columnist responsible. Whenever there were frontline defeats, it was Yermak’s micro-management at fault.
It was often somewhat hard to avoid to suspicion that Yermak was being made into the scapegoat. Easier to blame Yermak than Zelensky. Ukraine’s current national strategy is rather suicidal, so it’s always convenient to ignore the obvious demographic and economic disadvantages in the war with Russia and instead blame the traitor Yermak.
The military nationalist behind the telegram ‘Tales of the IV Reich’ bemoaned the way that Zelensky has escaped criticism through the focus on Yermak with the following November 29 post:
The acronym ‘OZU’ stands for organized crime group, and Mindich is the old friend of Zelensky’s that the current corruption fracas began with.
It can be quite good to have a scapegoat. Losing one can bring the fire where it shouldn’t go. Opposition MP Yaroslav Zheleznyak predicted on November 29 that the loss of Yermak would be quite damaging for Zelensky’s own PR:
However, Yermak was never just a scapegoat. He is a a rather interesting fellow in his own right. Here are two classic Zelensky quotes about him:
— ‘Yermak will go when I go’ (2021)
— ‘Yermak is a powerful manager. One of the very powerful managers in my team. I respect him for the results. He does what I tell him.’ (2024)
With Yermak gone, Zelensky’s days may also be numbered. It was Yermak’s unquestioning loyalty that Zelensky valued so much. Now, Zelensky must fend for himself among a constellation of political forces with their own interests.
First, a brief recapitulation on the Yermak phenomenon.
I wrote about Yermak’s background in law and show business here, as well as his quite real links with the Russian elite. His father’s role as the Soviet trade emissary in 1980s Afghanistan (read: KGB) gave his son some excellent contacts. It was these contacts that Yermak activated in late 2019 to conduct secret negotiations with Russia, the foreign policy adventure that catapulted him to the heights of power.
Analyzing Yermak as a Kremlin spy is a red herring. In fact, Yermak was always a typical representative of the post-soviet Ukrainian elite. Show business, law, contacts in Moscow and Washington, personal relationships with both Alexander Soros and Rudy Giulani.
Anyway, Yermaks come and go, but the formula stays the same.
The whole Yermak-Zelensky story is nothing new. The scheme is simple: come to power promising an end to corruption, entrench power with your closest friends. And how can you blame them, I suppose - Ukrainian politics is a cut-throat arena. If you don’t have a loyal clan around you, the rival clans will get you. The powers of the president are so far-reaching, and the struggle for resources so fierce.
Leonid Kuchma (1994-2005), Ukraine’s second president, created the system the whole democratic world knows and loves to this day. He also had his own Yermak - the much-hated and ultra-influential head of his presidential administration, Dmytro Tabachnik.
Following the 2004 ‘Orange Revolution’, the much-feted pro-western liberal reformer Victor Yushchenko ruled from 2005 to 2010. But instead of prosperity, he is mainly remembered with the friends ‘lyubi druzy’ - my beloved friends. This was the term that emerged for Yushchenko’s corrupt entourage. A phrase in the Ukrainian language, to befit Ukraine’s first Ukrainian-language leader. What a difference that made. The Yermak analogue there was Viktor Baloga.

Viktor Yanukovych (2010-14) made quite the name for himself, what with the flamingos strutting about his golden mansion and the so-called ‘family’ of relatives and trusted young Donetsk hustlers that rose to meteoric heights under his guidance.
Apart from the family, there was also Sergei Lyovochkin, head of Yanukovych’s presidential administration. Lyovochkin remains a highly influential gray eminence in Ukrainian politics. Yermak and Zelensky have a number of deep ties with him, a fact that the nationalist opposition press enjoys dwelling on.

The 2014 euromaidan revolution for Dignity, European Values, Western Civilization and a whole list of other wonderful things didn’t change much. The ‘western reformer’ Petro Poroshenko (2014-2019) now invited oligarchs to meet with his advisors through the back door of the presidential administration. Boris Lozhkin was the fellow oligarch in charge of the administration, yet another Yermak figure.
And though the NABU and other anti-corruption organs were created in 2014 with western funding, they haven’t achieved much. No top-level official has ever actually been jailed.
The main purpose of the NABU seems to be a way of assuring the western sponsors that ‘Ukraine isn’t Russia’. Unlike the congenitally corrupt Russkis, Ukraine is at least trying to do something about corruption. Tell that to the frontline Ukrainian militarists jealous of Russia’s approach towards corruption, which is less concerned with rule of law and more focused on defenestration.
Some think everything is going the right way. Listening to Ukrainska Pravda, Ukraine’s largest western-funded media platform, their journalists have been overcome with joy at the news about Yermak.
They see themselves and their friends at the NABU as heroes, fighting a desperate, lonely battle against the swamp of Ukrainian corruption. And now, Yermak’s resignation shows that their struggle has not been for naught!
But is he really gone?
So, back to the events of ‘Yermak’s Black Friday’, as it’s already been christened.

Here’s how Ukrainska Pravda journalist Mykhailo Tkach described them, based on their observation of the NABUs stakeout of the area (which implies that Ukrpravda was tipped off beforehand by the NABU):
At around 6 a.m. NABU and SAPO (Specialized Anti-corruption Prosecutor’s Office) employees entered or tried to enter the government quarter. There were some issues because they were not being let in. In the end, they basically forced their way in; they didn’t wait. They were told: “Wait, now we’ll get permission from this department, then that one, it needs approval…” and they said: “We have urgent investigative actions, you understand, while we’re standing here, some evidence or documents may be destroyed.” So after about 7–10 minutes of all these arguments, they had to go straight into the government quarter.
And after that, we lost sight of them. There was information from Dzerkalo Tyzhnia [another top liberal publication - EIU] that searches were conducted in the President’s Office, at Yermak’s workplace and at a residence somewhere near the Presidential Administration. Our sources in law enforcement do not confirm searches in the President’s Office. They do confirm searches at Andriy Yermak’s place of residence. They say, and emphasize, that several devices were seized — phones, laptops, and their contents. And all this, as far as we understand, is currently being examined by the relevant bodies.
How long did the searches last? Not that long. The searches on Hrushevsky 9 lasted from 6 a.m. to about, I think, 7 p.m., but there were many apartments belonging to Mindich or people connected to Mindich. And everything had to be inspected. Here, it seems everything ended around two in the afternoon, and the process moved into studying all these gadgets and devices, and obtaining some evidence — or not obtaining it — in the proceedings in which the head of the President’s Office, Andriy Yermak, may appear.
In other words, as with the November 10 NABU raids that started all this to begin with, there was clearly some sort of leakage from the NABU. Nor is this surprising — back in 2024, the big story around the NABU were the endless signs that the institution was quite porous for Yermak and his people. Zelensky’s July 2025 attempt to remove the independence of the NABU resulted in some amnesia for that aspect of the NABU, but it has certainly gone nowhere.
Opposition MP Oleksiy Honcharenko also raised questions about just how thorough the NABU raid on Yermak had been in a November 29 post. ‘UP’ refers to Ukrainska Pravda:
That’s not the only thing that’s gone nowhere. Yermak has left, but his people remain. The Office of the President (OP, Bankova) is filled with people carefully chosen by Yermak for their personal loyalty and connections.
There are many names here, but probably none as notorious as that of Oleg Tatarov. Possibly the third most powerful man in the country, after Zelensky and Yermak. He is often named as the man in charge of Ukraine’s law enforcement. If he goes too, then it’ll definitely be possible to speak of a qualitative transformation of the ruling elite.
Tatarov has always been hated just as much as Yermak by the liberal nationalist press. He also has even more compromising relations with the pre-2014 ‘pro-Russian’ (hardly) ruling government.
But it’s also worth noting some relevant speculations. Last week, I covered reports in the Ukrainian press that the Security Services of Ukraine (SBU) had refused Zelensky/Yermak’s demand to go after their enemies. This is quite unprecedented, given the willingness of the SBU to go after the NABU and other western-funded liberal enemies of Zelensky in 2024-25.
Perhaps Tatarov, curator of the SBU, had decided it was time to throw in his loyalties with Zelensky’s enemies? Tatarov is nothing more than a rather skilled opportunist. The NABU, despite their high-flung liberal rhetoric, are also probably cooperating with imprisoned oligarch Igor Kolomoisky in investigating the Zelensky-Yermak clique. A tactical alliance with Tatarov certainly wouldn’t be out of the question.
Besides Yermak’s men, whence Yermak himself?
On November 28, Yermak told the New York post he intended to head to the frontlines.
This was interpreted by many as a way to avoid justice. As a soldier, Yermak would be under the jurisdiction of the State Bureau of Investigations, which is widely considered totally controlled by Yermak’s men. MP Mariana Bezuhla, until a few months ago a Yermak loyalist, wrote this on November 29:

For his part, the military nationalist running the telegram ‘Tales of the IV Reich’ (or Empire) doubted that anything would change unless Yermak is officially charged. His reference to ‘voivods’ is part of his long-standing line that both Russia and Ukraine are ruled by the same feudalistic lords:
Let’s now move further. What is the real significance of Yermak’s removal? Domestic political squabbles, or a grand Trump-Putin conspiracy to force Ukraine to capitulate? Why are frontline nationalists unimpressed by the entire affair, including the antics of the so-called ‘opposition? How is
Valery Zaluzhny’s press intervention related to the narrative that Yermak’s removal is part of a plot to force Ukraine to sign a peace deal? And finally, who will replace Yermak?
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