Frontline newsletter

Russian infantry tactics. Ukrainian organizational problems. The need for a cult of war and a warrior aristocracy. Pessimism of the will, war crimes now. Zombie brigades.

Roman Ponamarenko, military historian and officer of Azov, September 3. His description of the reality of the frontline meshes with what other military journalists have been stressing - that the Russian offensive operates through small infantry groups of 2-5 soldiers without heavy armory, so as to best avoid detection by drones:

I read a story from one commentator about how Russian soldiers in Donbas, in Soviet-style, run en masse towards Ukrainian machine guns. It’s about time they finally threw away this trope. Here’s a secret: Russians haven’t done that in a long time, at least not the experienced fighters from battle-hardened brigades. On the contrary, during an offensive, they often act tactically and boldly. They use the terrain, drones, and their artillery advantage.

For example, in the Donbas agglomerations, the enemy uses a “saturation tactic,” taking advantage of the fact that there is no continuous front line there. Small groups of 3-10 soldiers infiltrate our battle formations through settlements or wooded areas. Sometimes several other groups follow the first one. As a result, a group of enemy soldiers suddenly appears in a settlement controlled by us. Then, depending on the situation, they either capture a building or several buildings, where they fortify themselves, distracting our forces, or move out and threaten our positions from the rear. This is how they advance.

The good news is that many of our commanders have adapted to this enemy tactic and learned how to counter it. Constant aerial reconnaissance allows us to detect these groups in advance. They are hit on the approach by drones and mortars. Or they are simply tracked, and the buildings they enter are identified and then blocked and destroyed along with the enemy. There are many such cases across the Donbas front.

The problem is that this doesn’t always happen. Not all Ukrainian units can conduct effective aerial reconnaissance (there are objective reasons for this—lack of trained personnel, resources, and even some commanders’ lack of understanding of its importance). And not all commanders know how to effectively counter enemy groups that have infiltrated after they reveal themselves.

In general, the enemy’s actions must be studied, analyzed, and learned from to effectively destroy them on an industrial scale. The enemy should not be underestimated, especially in the third year of the war.

A September 8 post on Russian infantry tactics by the Aidar (a nationalist battalion) soldier Stanislav Bunyatov. Given his large audience (263,000 telegram followers), a bit of exaggeration is to be expected:

The enemy has developed a new effective night combat tactic.

• In groups of 2-3 people, they run across the fields to our rear and set up a defensive perimeter. Despite suffering 80% losses, 20% still manage to reach their objective.

• The assault group that has gathered overnight begins attacking our positions from behind in the morning, drawing attention away from the front.

• During this time, additional groups of 5-6 people move in using the same approach, forming an assault unit the size of a company.

I think everyone understands the outcome of this.

Major Kukharchuk of Azov, September 12. I was particularly interested by his criticism of Ukrainian organizational chaos, a very common theme nowadays. A recent article of mine went into Butusov’s thoughts on the same topic - ‘we are the only army in the world fighting only with brigades, while our enemy fights with armies and corps’.

Kukharchuk’s point about engineering units is also a common one - plenty of military journalists have explained Russian advances by the low quality of defensive lines created by the corrupt and unskilled military-civil administration. In another recent interview, Kukharchuk advocated creating special military units composed of engineers to create high quality fortification - he also hoped this would solve mobilization problems by giving the mobilized less dangerous jobs.