Kursk: Telegram commentary
Strange alliance - Russian militarist bloggers and Kiev. Speculations on battles inside the Kremlin. Zrada and peremoha. Prigozhin and Malofeev. Ukrainian nationalists and anti-west Trumpists weigh in
A strange ‘offensive’ by Ukrainian forces into a border region of Russia in recent days.
My apologies for using the Kagan/Nuland managed ISW as a source. Keep in mind that the ‘claimed Ukrainian advances’ represent places where Ukrainian troops have seen. It is becoming more and more clear that though this ‘offensive’ is significantly larger than the previous raids by the neo-nazi Russian Volunteer Corps on Belgorod region, it is still fundamentally characterized by lurching adventures by small mobile groups.
That is, rather than actually controlling territory, Ukrainian troops are galloping about to cause havoc. With the ultimate aim being informational. Informationally, rather than militarily - the post-modern MI6 approach. Considered in this manner, the strange Kursk affair is not without fruits.
But it all seems to me like yet another gamble, predicated on that favorite Ukrainian bet - that Russia is on the brink of collapsing. And if it’s all so weak, then why not keep fighting it? A self-reinforcing fiction - since we keep fighting Russia, and Russia keeps escalating, we need to believe even more fervently that Russia is on the brink of collapse. I touched on this Ukrainian nationalist obsession with Russia’s imminent collapse here
Anyway, back to Kursk. Here’s what the Ukrainian telegram commentators have to say:
Strana.ua, a euroatlantic-critical Ukrainian publication, August 8, on the strange alliance between Russian nationalist military telegram channels (Z-publics) and Kyiv:
The main narrative in pro-government Russian media and public channels regarding the Ukrainian Armed Forces' advance in the Kursk region is roughly as follows: "The Ukrainian attack is evidence of the Kyiv regime's dying agony, a provocation aimed at sowing panic and distrust towards the authorities in Russian society, and forcing the Russian command to redeploy reserves from the Ukrainian front to Kursk to weaken the pressure. Therefore, such provocations should not be succumbed to. No matter how far the Ukrainian Armed Forces advance in the Kursk region, they will eventually be pushed back, and Ukraine will be defeated."
This narrative is understandable from the perspective of the Russian authorities in the current conditions (when, apparently, the Russian army's command is indeed not planning to withdraw large reserves from the front to quickly eliminate the breach).
However, this narrative could be undermined by the Z-publics, which, as during Prigozhin's mutiny, are now becoming the main channel for spreading "zrada” [EIU: the Ukrainian word for betrayal, which has become a meme since 2014 to represent the emotional rollercoasters from zrada to peremoha (victory) so characteristic of Ukrainian - and often Russian - nationaoists] in Russian society. Z-Telegram channels are filled with accusations against the command, and sometimes even Putin. There are calls for purges in the army and other destabilizing actions.
In essence, they are doing exactly what the Ukrainian authorities expect, who decided to send large forces to attack the Kursk region instead of, for example, Toretsk or New York, to push back Russian troops from those areas. The informational significance of the battles in Toretsk and Sudzha in terms of their impact on Russians is, of course, incomparable.
Additionally, some Z-publics from the network previously controlled by Prigozhin, and now by Konstantin Malofeev, are using the Ukrainian Armed Forces' advance as an excuse to try to "remove" Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov, who retained his position after Shoigu's dismissal. All of this also increases the degree of "zrada" within Russia, which, as mentioned earlier, is exactly what Ukraine is aiming for. In this sense, the Z-publics are becoming important allies of Kyiv.
Strana.ua, August 9:
Russian Z-publics continue to fuel "zrada", panic, and hysteria around the situation in the Kursk region.
There have been no reports of new advances by the Ukrainian Armed Forces there today, so the new reason for spreading "zrada" became the strike on a Russian military convoy near Rylsk.
Such incidents are not uncommon in the current war. As soon as the intelligence of one side detects a concentration of enemy personnel and equipment (it’s not always possible to disperse quickly), a strike is carried out on it.
However, this particular incident has attracted special attention from Z-military bloggers. At the same time, Russian state media, which publish videos of troop movements, have also been criticized.
It's worth noting that in Russia, unlike in Ukraine, it is not legally prohibited to film troop movements, the moments, and consequences of strikes. Last year, this issue was raised in Russia, but the same Z-military bloggers opposed the adoption of such a law. They had their own interest: most of them were waging an information war against the Russian army's command in the person of Shoigu and Gerasimov. Publishing moments of strikes and their consequences helped in this information war.
They are actively publishing such content even now.
Overall, it can be said that a number of the largest Z-publics have launched a systematic war against the military leadership of Russia, actively shaking up both society and the army, thus acting as the most important allies of Ukraine in destabilizing Russia. In general, they are doing the same thing they were doing over a year ago, on the eve of Prigozhin's mutiny. After its failure, they slowed down a bit, but now they are once again operating at "full capacity."
Interestingly, the Russian authorities, who prosecute people even for putting the word "special operation" in quotation marks, are not reacting to any of this. Yet, a single high-profile Z-blogger discredits the Russian army much more than all the "foreign agents" combined.
What’s the explanation for this paradox? Most of the Z-publics currently spreading "zrada" are part of the network that was previously controlled by Prigozhin and is now overseen by Konstantin Malofeev (we wrote in detail about this here). They are using the Ukrainian Armed Forces' advance in the Kursk region as an excuse to try to "remove" Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov.
According to information in Russian media and publics, this is also being sought by some "Kremlin towers," some leaders of the Russian special services, and certain representatives of Putin's inner circle who are trying to put their own person in charge of the army. Therefore, they do not interfere with the current wave of panic and hysteria in the Z-publics, and may even be facilitating it.
Last year, to try to remove Shoigu and Gerasimov, they used Prigozhin, giving him carte blanche to harshly criticize the Russian Ministry of Defense. That "personnel intrigue" ended with the Wagner mutiny, which almost derailed Russia.
This time, the consequences for the situation in society, and especially in the army, could be no less significant. Unless the Kremlin decides to finally put a stop to this "rampant freedom of speech" at its root.
Strana.ua , August 11:
What processes within Russia were triggered by the Ukrainian Armed Forces' advance in the Kursk region?
One of the strangest phenomena in the situation in the Kursk region is the systematic exaggeration of "zrada" and panic by major Z-channels.
The situation in the Kursk region is difficult for Russia. It is still unknown whether Russian troops have been able to stabilize the front. It is possible that the Ukrainian Armed Forces might indeed capture Sudzha. They may even launch an offensive in another border direction. At the same time, it seems that the Russian military-political leadership does not want to redeploy large units from the Ukrainian front (where the Russian army currently has the potential to launch a major offensive). This suggests that stabilizing the situation in the Kursk region might not be so quick. Not to mention pushing Ukrainian troops back across the border. Under such conditions, as we have previously written, the Russian authorities attempted to launch an information campaign to prepare society for prolonged combat operations in the Kursk region, with the expectation of an "inevitable victory" in the future.
However, the hysteria and spreading of "zrada" by Z-channels have disrupted this plan.
If, immediately after Russia's invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian public channels had reacted to it in the same way that Russian channels are now reacting to the Ukrainian Armed Forces' advance in the Kursk region (and there were many questions about the military-political leadership of the country at that time), Ukraine would have fallen within a few days.
Therefore, the current situation in the Kursk region once again confirms the fact, which we have already pointed out: there is significantly more order and discipline (including self-discipline) in the Ukrainian information space than in the Russian one. And this is one of Ukraine's main advantages in the current war.
The situation is even more paradoxical given that the Z-channels, which are spreading panic, position themselves as "pro-Putin" and "pro-war," advocating for "war until the victorious end," yet they are doing everything possible to undermine Russia's ability to wage this war by destabilizing the army and society, and discrediting the army's command.
The version that these channels are simply "hype-driven" to increase the number of subscribers and fundraising for their livelihoods only partially explains the situation.
The authors of most of these channels are well-known and reside in Moscow. Therefore, the Kremlin and Russian special services could stop this information chaos in a moment with a single phone call. But for some reason, they don't.
Most of the Z-channels currently spreading "zrada" previously belonged to the so-called "Prigozhin network" (and prepared the ground for the mutiny), and are now managed by the co-owner of the "Tsargrad" TV channel, Konstantin Malofeev. However, Malofeev is not influential enough to be an "untouchable" protector for these "zrada” channels." Therefore, without the support of part of the "Kremlin towers," part of the Russian special services, and representatives of Putin's inner circle, such a "free-for-all" in Telegram channels would be impossible. This means they are at least not being hindered, and possibly even supported.
Why?
The most obvious explanation is an attempt to "remove" the current Chief of the General Staff, Gerasimov, and bring their own people to the army's command. Essentially, this is what this same group (apparently) wanted to do back in 2023, using Prigozhin as a battering ram, allowing him to shout, "Shoigu, Gerasimov, where are the shells?"
But even then, the means used (crushing criticism of the army command, which ultimately led to a mutiny that almost destroyed Russia) seemed clearly disproportionate to the stated goal (the change of leadership in the Ministry of Defense). Although Prigozhin claimed that the purpose of his march on Moscow was only the resignation of Shoigu and Gerasimov, it is quite clear that if the "Wagnerites," after being publicly labeled as mutineers and traitors by Putin, had managed to capture Moscow, even if they had left Putin in the Kremlin, he would have become a nominal ruler. And most likely, he would have been forced to hand over power in the 2024 elections to someone else. Someone indicated to him by the beneficiaries of the mutiny (although, it is quite possible that there would have been no transfer of power at all, and instead, a time of troubles, the collapse of the country, and a series of military coups would have begun).
The current campaign in the Z-channels also goes beyond mere informational preparation for personnel changes in the General Staff, and even beyond the Kremlin's desire to "keep the generals on their toes" (this is one of the common theories regarding the authorities' tolerance of criticism of the army by the Z-publics).
Because the campaign primarily targets not Gerasimov, about whom a significant portion of the Russian population knows very little. It primarily targets Putin personally. It's not Gerasimov, but Putin who is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the guarantor of Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. It's not Gerasimov, but Putin who delivered the address announcing the start of the "special operation." Therefore, in this specific case, the narrative of "the tsar is good, but the boyars are bad" doesn't work.
People may start asking questions—if things are as bad as the Z-channels claim, why is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief silent? Why aren't any extraordinary measures being taken?
Simultaneously, the same channels are constantly pushing the idea—"if only Prigozhin were alive, this wouldn’t be happening," which also undermines Putin, who declared the "Wagnerites" mutiny to be "treacherous."
The campaign being conducted by the Z-channels undermines the morale of Russian society and the army, eroding trust in the country's military-political leadership. This could have particularly serious consequences for the situation in the army, which is the "target audience" of the Z-channels.
Therefore, it is difficult to assume that all this is being done merely to remove Gerasimov. Just as it was difficult to believe that Prigozhin was marching on Moscow solely to remove Shoigu.
This seems more like a complex plan by a certain group within the Russian elite for some changes within Russia (including, possibly, the removal of Putin from power), with taking control of the army command (by placing their own person in the position of Chief of the General Staff) being just one, albeit a very important, step.
Whether this group is acting independently or in coordination with Ukraine and the West is an open question. There is a widespread theory in Ukrainian and Russian political circles that Prigozhin (or his handlers) coordinated their actions with Kyiv and Western intelligence agencies. If this theory is applied to the current situation, then the Ukrainian Armed Forces' advance in the Kursk region and the campaign in the Z-channels can be seen as part of a unified scenario plan, managed from a single center.
However, even if we dismiss these "conspiracy theories," it is logical to assume that Ukraine and the West, knowing about certain processes within the Russian elite, are taking actions intended to accelerate these processes.
Before Prigozhin's mutiny, there were incursions into the Belgorod region. Then the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched an offensive on the southern front. Now, there is the advance in the Kursk region, which has caused a "zrada" in the Z-channels, in much the same format as before the mutiny. At the same time, the current wave of "zrada" has become a sort of rehearsal for how and through whom the situation in Russia can be "shaken up" on various problematic issues. In the same way as in the Kursk region, the Z-publics could ignite the topic of, for example, interethnic relations, which would threaten Russia with an internal explosion and the collapse of the army (which includes many representatives of national minorities and Muslims).
Currently, these processes are still in their infancy, and Putin has all the tools to neutralize them. However, so far, the Kremlin has not taken any specific actions in this direction.
Maksim Buzhansky, a parliamentarian critical of the west in Zelensky’s party, August 11:
I fully and completely share the euphoria over the advance of our troops, just like everyone else, and I'm happy to see that the myth of Russia's invincibility has cracked like an eggshell.
But I'm convinced that discussing, in all seriousness, who owned the Kursk region a hundred years ago, while the enemy is steadily advancing in Donetsk, is absolute madness.
We are fighting, without any false bravado, practically a Holy War for the Independence and existence of our state.
Against an aggressor who attacked us, whose guilt is obvious to absolutely everyone in the world and cannot be atoned for.
To reduce all of this, even in words, to some murky story of a war over some disputed territories, I'm talking about Kursk, is exactly what Russia dreams of.
To remove from itself the stigma of being an aggressor.
This must not be done.
We have a goal—to defend ourselves, and for that to succeed, we need to focus on it with all our thoughts and emotions, without getting distracted by fantasies, philosophizing, or empty theories.
And let Kursk burn in hell, no matter who it belongs to.
Aleksandr Dubinsky, August 11. Another parliamentarian critical of the west, in Zelensky’s party until 2021. Unlike Buzhansky, he is currently in prison for his role in the Hunter Biden saga (see this article):
Pay attention to the headlines in the foreign press—this is also one of the tasks of the counter-PR offensive in the Kursk region.
A week ago, all these headlines were about losses in Donbas, the Russian advance, and the necessity of negotiations amid the belief that the situation on the front would inevitably worsen.
All of this was a platform to pressure Ukraine into peace negotiations. The attack in the Kursk region changed the narrative and presented the Ukrainian Armed Forces as a force that can win.
A very sharp turnaround.
Now, the main thing is to ensure that this doesn't turn into even deeper disappointment, because then it will be the last all-in bet.
Tales of the IV Empire (formerly ‘of the IV Reich’), August 7. This nationalist telegram is run by an Azov officer, and describes itself as ‘herald of the ultraright youth’:
Today, I'm reading a lot of skepticism in our public channels regarding the special military operation in the Kursk region. Many people, not fully understanding the situation, are writing about Toretsk, New York, Pokrovsk, and don't understand why our army is crossing the border instead of throwing fresh reserves at some shack near Kurakhovo.
With a fresh mechanized brigade in the Kursk region, equipped with senior commander’s attached means, one can get things done. In the summer of 2022, with these forces, you could reach Kursk, in the summer of 2023—to Kurchatov, and now you can bite off Sudzha, capture prisoners, show the world the needed picture, and destroy a large amount of weaponry and equipment. With a fresh mechanized brigade near New York, you can deploy, lose half of the equipment and personnel due to artillery and airstrikes, then with the remnants of a company-tactical group, make a push towards the enemy’s forward strongpoints, suffer a bit from drops and FPV—and that's it, the brigade is finished, send in a new one.
I think the military-political leadership has an understanding of the situation in Donetsk Oblast. This understanding extends months ahead. It is pessimistic, disheartening, frustrating, and unacceptable. But they seemingly don’t want to send newly formed units to a village with four goats and two dogs left, which is being hit by a hundred 152mm shells a day and a dozen KABs.
The border in Russia is covered by far from elite forces (neither is ours, by the way). Akhmat has fled, leaving behind local territorial defense forces and motorized infantry battalions, including conscripts. The fashionable "senezh" units, by the way, have been sent far away to guard the Kurchatov Nuclear Power Plant. When the Ukrainian Armed Forces cross the border in tanks, the Russian special forces become more necessary guarding the power unit 60 km from the border. Russian conscripts will die for them. As the saying goes, "Each to their own."