Military newsletter - 'Time is running out'

Kurakhove, Selidove. The missing 152nd brigade. Protests by MIA relatives. The Russian officer training system versus Ukrainian 'extreme indifference'. Personnel and communication problems.

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To begin with, what do Ukrainian military telegrams think of Zelensky’s wonderful ‘victory plan’? FRONT, which describes itself as ‘media by soldiers for soldiers’, published this on October 24:

We will see Russia at the Peace Summit when Ukraine's Victory Plan is fully implemented," – Zelensky.

So how are wars won? Judging from Zelensky’s constant demands and pronouncements, wars are won by wunderwaffe - Leopard tanks, F16s, ATACMS and so on.

That obviously hasn’t worked out great, which doesn’t mean Zelensky will stop trying. Plenty of Ukrainian analysts, such as Ruslan Bortnyk, argue that the significance of Zelensky’s constant demand for long-range missiles and other wunderwaffe is motivated less by the possible damage they could do to the Russian army, and more by the aim of provoking a Russia-NATO war, the only situation where Ukrainian military defeat through attrition isn’t guaranteed (of course, neither is anyone’s existence, but that matters less I suppose).

But in a non-nuclear battle, wunderwaffe haven’t proven too effective. To begin with, this high-tech approach neglects the much more real quantitative factors - how many troops you can mobilize, how many shells you can produce. It turns out that good old-fashioned Korean Juche is much more effective on this front than the EU ‘garden of civilization’.

But more importantly, it ignores what war is really fought by - humans, and the organizational structures that link them together. I’ve written here at length about the institutional anarchy that characterizes the Ukrainian army, which Ukrainian military analysts constantly bemoan. In short, just as the Ukrainian elite and society broadly is characterized by corrupt, individualized clans rather than solid institutions, the army is dominated by rent-seeking generals for whom the preservation of their soldiers’ lives or organizational reform is hardly a priority.

Parliamentarian Mariana Bezuhla (see my profile on her here), ever-enthusiastic critic of ‘corrupt soviet generals’, published the following on October 21:

And now a bit more about Syrskyi's "advisor," General Holodniuk:

General Oleksandr Holodniuk, little known to the general public but well-regarded in military circles, has become one of the key generals in the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF). His career began in the Ground Forces, but later, under Syrskyi's direction, he was transferred to the General Staff while retaining his previous position and salary (on assignment). There, he uses his connections to address personal matters and protect the interests of the "family"—a faction supporting the current Commander-in-Chief of the UAF. At the same time, the general is reluctant to leave his position as deputy commander of the Ground Forces, demanding changes in salaries for the entire army's generals to maintain his pay.

In military circles, Holodniuk is often referred to as Syrskyi's "wallet." In the Ground Forces, he allegedly used financial means to resolve issues, such as arranging foreign missions for servicemen. When the Commander-in-Chief of the UAF avoids direct involvement in questionable matters, Holodniuk steps in to handle them. Moreover, with privileged access to the Commander-in-Chief and substantial compromising material from their "shared affairs," Holodniuk manipulates the promotion of certain officers and career decisions of senior leadership according to his discretion.

His attempts to establish contacts with international partners in a Soviet-style negotiation manner have caused additional conflicts and misunderstandings. As a "political officer" by nature, Holodniuk actively opposes the integration of medical and psychological services, insisting on maintaining the outdated "political officer" hierarchy, among other things.

As we can see, a group of MPs, under the tarnished brand of the "National Security Committee," casually engages with Holodniuk about "reforms" like legalizing certain privileges and mobilizing 20-year-olds, all without raising uncomfortable questions about their "family" within the general staff

.

Training

But another topic I’ve been itching to cover is that of military training. The formation and reproduction of an officer elite is also a favorite topic of military analysts and Azov spokesmen on TV, who constantly complain about the nefarious ‘corrupt Soviet military elite’ and the lack of a ‘truly nationally conscious officer class’.

But beyond these fairly vague categories (as if nationalists can’t be corrupt, and as if old Soviet/Russian-trained generals can’t be nationalist - see Zaluzhny), what really interests me is how exactly the officers are trained. I’ve heard rumors of ‘training’ for mobilized troops that consists of throwing a rock as if it were a grenade - then straight to the front. No wonder only one out of every twenty-five mobilized troops is actually willing to fight.

Something more concrete on the topic came from an October 20 interview with oppositional reserve Major Serhii Krivonos, former deputy commander of Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces, ex-deputy secretary of the National Security and Defense Council.

In response to the constant questions by the reporter regarding the current ‘scandals’ in the army (a commander who apparently used to be pro-Russian, a politician suspiciously ‘serving’ in a unit), Krivonos answers that these mediatized scandals are simply a way to distract attention from the real catastrophe on the frontlines. I was happy to hear that, because I’m honestly tired of listening to these endless ‘investigations’ about personalized scandals in the army.

Krivonos argues that the real problem isn’t that politicians (the example here is Oleh Lyashko - more on this case in a future article perhaps) are being given military positions they don’t necessarily deserve. He focuses on the fundamental problem:

There is an overwhelming shortage of professionals in categories such as platoon commanders, company commanders, and battalion commanders. When it comes to competent individuals in these positions, there are even fewer. This highlights the lack of structured officer training through accelerated courses, which need to be expanded.

I'll give you a simple example from the enemy's side. This doesn't mean I'm promoting them, but I'm observing how seriously they approach the war. Meanwhile, we seem to be indifferent to the extreme. In 2022, the Russians established over 50 training departments and centers based in civilian higher education institutions. I ask, how many such departments have we organized in our civilian institutions? You would be surprised to find almost none.

The issue of officer training is significant. Unfortunately, junior officers are treated as a human resource that depletes quickly due to injuries or fatalities. As a result, promotions happen based on the situation, but the numbers of departing and incoming officers don't match the needs. This is a serious flaw that should have been addressed.

Our military academies, which were supposed to switch to wartime structures after the war was declared, should have been preparing officers in accelerated programs ranging from six months to four months, depending on the specialty. However, cadets are still being trained for 4-5 years. I ask: are we truly at war?

This shortage of officers is due to the fact that no one is preparing them based on wartime requirements. Some military units and training centers have not fully transitioned to wartime operations. This raises questions about why we aren't preparing the necessary number of officers. Initially, we relied on promoting sergeants, but now we also lack enough sergeants.

The system for training specialists isn't working, neither at the military nor civilian level. We also have a large number of reserve officers who could at least teach the basics of combat or technical skills. Unfortunately, on a national level, this hasn't been organized.

If we calculate the number of officers, especially high-ranking ones, who have been dismissed, we could assign each one to oversee training in regional centers or powerful cities. Why hasn't this been done? Because there's no unified understanding of what the state needs. We have implemented some fragmented efforts, but we haven't developed a systematic, long-term strategy for the coming years.

Time is running out.

Tales of the IV Reich, a telegram managed by an Azov batallion sergeant. October 20:

It is being reported that the basic combat training course for mobilized personnel in the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be extended from 30 to 45 days. This is a complex issue, not just in terms of time, but also in approach and the quality of instructors. Often, there are many questions, not only regarding the material resources but also about the quality of the training sessions and preparatory activities.

That said, I believe that whether it's a month or a month and a half, it is far too little time to turn a civilian into a military professional. It’s important to take into account that by the end of 2024, the situation at the front is so critical that the journey from the recruitment office to the frontlines usually takes about 35 days: one or two days before the start of the basic combat training course, 30 days for the course, and a couple of days for transport to the brigade’s defense area. Therefore, this process should last 60-90 days, excluding the time spent at the permanent deployment point.

The approach in brigades varies greatly: in well-organized brigades with competent commanders, mobilized personnel spend an additional 10-20 days training with sergeants within their units. In poorly organized brigades, recruits are issued uniforms, a rusty AK-74, and sent to the frontline positions the same evening.

The basic combat training course was created to standardize the provision of primary knowledge and transfer of instructors' practical experience. To send a person directly into combat, a minimum of 2-3 months of training is needed, not just 45 days. Otherwise, it only adds to the already overwhelmed sergeant ranks, who are then burdened with the additional training of mobilized soldiers in frontline villages.

Lost in communication

Thoughts from a Frontline Fighter, October 24:

A long post, I hope you won’t get tired of reading, but I have to get this off my chest…

The "Bakhmut Problem," or why do we keep losing positions?

Radio Communication! ⚡️ One of the biggest current problems is the lack of communication with neighboring positions and units. With proper radio communication, we could better coordinate our actions during combat operations.

Why did I call it the "Bakhmut Problem"? While defending Bakhmut, I personally encountered this issue. I believe that one of the reasons for losing the city was the lack of communication.

To give you some context – we have two types of signals: "digital" and "analog."

• Digital: This is an encrypted signal, which can be received, but to decode it, you need the corresponding radio station firmware.

• Analog: This is an open signal, which only requires you to switch to the appropriate channel (like searching for a song on your car radio).

Our army typically uses Motorola DP4400/4800 radios (costing 20,000₴+), which operate on a digital signal. Other types of radios are also used.

Now, imagine a situation: you and your unit are defending an apartment building. You know that friendly forces are in neighboring buildings, but each of you has different firmware, so you can’t directly communicate. You can’t quickly request cover or share the current situation. Communication would only work:

1. If you had their radio.

2. If there is coordination between your command posts. The first point might help somewhat, but the second causes significant delays and often results in a game of "broken telephone." You can test this yourself at home – try cooking with a partner but communicate only through a third person acting as a switchboard operator.

Meanwhile, the enemy 🇷🇺 uses two types of communication. Regular soldiers up to squad leaders use analog radios, which improves communication. These radios cost about 1,000-2,500₴, making it affordable to equip every soldier. Enemy platoon commanders use both digital and analog radios. The digital one is for command and control without risking information leaks, while the analog one helps them coordinate with their unit and others nearby by tuning to the appropriate frequency.

In contrast, our units use digital communication from soldiers to command posts, allowing the enemy to intercept operational information if they capture one of our radios. While we can block the lost radio if we know its serial number, this doesn’t always work because the radios need to be reprogrammed, which is a complicated task. It involves taking the radio off the front lines and returning it, which today is an unnecessary risk.

Draw your own conclusions…

Death

With or without training and radios, wars are characterized by one thing. One Azov fighter who lost his legs at war said in an October 19 interview that ‘fighting in the AFU is a one-way ticket’:

You can get out of the army in three ways: first — on crutches, second — death, and the third — doesn't exist.

Death is in the air. On October 8, Ukrainian journalist, military veteran and parliamentarian Ihor Mosiychuk published the following:

#we_are_written_to🖊️

The 152nd Brigade has gone missing in large numbers... in the Pokrovsk direction, where my father disappeared. The brigade commander is Yuriy Stepanovych Maksymiv. He’s making money in Kyiv like a military recruitment officer, it seems, in the Desnyansky district. The wounded and the dead haven't been retrieved, and no one is going to do it. The situation is a complete disaster. No one is saying anything, and they’re ignoring us.

If you can, I’m begging for exposure. If you need anything, I’ll add more 🙏🙏🙏🙏

On the same day, oppositional media publication strana.ua collected some of the many other reports of the catastrophe in the 152nd:

One Ukrainian woman posted a video on TikTok where she stated that her father, Volodymyr Merzlyakov, 51, who was mobilized in July, served in the mentioned brigade and went missing on September 14 in the Pokrovsk direction. He had been deployed after just three weeks of training. She also shared messages from others searching for their missing relatives who were assigned to other brigades. According to the young woman, all the mobilized soldiers were sent to the front lines ("to zero") without sufficient experience or proper training. Now, their relatives cannot get any information about them from either the brigades or the military enlistment offices (TCC) that called them up.

On October 24, Russian military telegrams shared videos of what was purportedly the commander of the grenade launcher platoon of the 152nd - he had surrendered, and complained that his unit had been sent to fight without any grenade-launchers.

On October 16, there was a protest in in Kyiv’s maidan square by relatives of those reported as MIA. It is quite clear that a great deal of the dead have been registered as MIA, if registered at all. Their slogan was ‘send the government to the trenches’.

On this topic, by the way, my favorite Azovite telegram Tales of the IV Reich published this on October 21:

The war will end when everyone who doesn’t want it to end finds themselves as regular infantrymen on the front line. This especially applies to the triumphalist heralds, belligerent bloggers from luxury apartment complexes in the capital, journalists from grant-funded publications, and other 'wonderful' people.

Russian tactics

Roman Ponomarev, Azov military historian, October 20:

The enemy continues its pressure across the entire Kurakhove direction. At the beginning of October, they gradually replaced the most exhausted units involved in the September assaults during the battle for Vuhledar and fully resumed offensive actions along the entire line from Zolota Niva to Kurakhivka. The most intense fighting is taking place near Maksymilianivka, east of Kurakhove, in Kostyantynivka, and around Katerynivka and Yelizavetivka.

The enemy's tactics involve methodical, regular use of assault units of up to company size, advancing simultaneously in armored vehicles and on foot. The mechanized units attempt to break into our first line of defense, sometimes even penetrating to the level of company strongpoints, where they set up circular defenses and then link up with foot assault groups.

While a single assault may not pose a significant risk to defensive positions and is often a death conveyor for the enemy, the repeated nature of these attacks allows them to disrupt defensive formations due to sheer numerical superiority. Eventually, there are more enemy troops than our own forces. FPV drones, typically effective against vehicles, have been less useful due to enemy use of multi-layered shielding combined with electronic warfare (EW) systems.

In this context, older second-generation anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), like the Stugna-P, could be effective if produced in adequate quantities. It might be advisable for battalions to form combined-arms reserves from the most prepared personnel, block and eliminate enemy units at landing zones, focus on mobile anti-tank weapons, and lay mines such as TM-62 or use remote mining.

Furthermore, brigades could benefit from a more maneuver-based defense rather than a static one, such as adopting Russian maneuver defense tactics like the "spring," where forces gradually retreat to well-prepared positions, launching counterattacks after exhausting the enemy. However, while these strategies are clear to everyone, they are challenging to implement for various reasons.

Nukes

With NATO not eager to accept Ukraine (in other news, the sky is blue), Zelensky has reverted to his usual shtick of threatening to develop a nuclear bomb.

Tales of the IV Reich. October 24:

Talks about nuclear weapons, unfortunately, are nothing more than a clumsy PR stunt in a one-man show. As I have already written, it is solely aimed at the Western electorate: this outburst has spread across all major Western media, and pro-Kremlin members of European parliaments have picked it up. I understand the president's goal was to show decisiveness, but it turned out the opposite – it showcased irrationality in the context of the long process of restoring nuclear status.

If we set aside the bluff and political PR, supporters of creating a Ukrainian version of ISIS and eternal war should study this experience. Uranium enrichment would take years and billions of dollars, which our country desperately lacks. However, creating a "dirty bomb" would take months with a very limited budget. Such a bomb, based on iridium stolen in Iraq, has already been attempted by other supporters of jihad to the last person from the notorious ISIS, but it was never used.

For now, as long as Ukraine has not begun producing nuclear weapons, our primary weapon remains FPV drones, for which my friends, who have been destroying Kremlin forces in the BNR since 2022, are raising funds. Please consider contributing.

Selidove

Time for a look at the hottest points on the map. First, Selidove a fairly large (pre-war population of 20,000) town in the Pokrovsk region. You can see it around the middle of the bottom map - right below the bend in the E50. Directly below it is Kurakhove, more on which later. The strategically important city of Pokrovsk is on the top left.

Stanislav Buniatov of the Aidar Batallion, October 23:

The situation in Selydove is, to put it mildly, bad.
After overcoming a difficult path to the city, the faggots began actively advancing through residential areas and have already occupied half of the settlement.

I think the reasons for such a collapse are clear... simply put, there is no one to hold the defense. In small groups, the enemy infiltrates through positions, and if they encounter resistance, they just bypass it.

Buniatov, October 24:

In Selydove, groups of faggots are coming in entire platoons.

Familiar FPV drone crews say they are making over 100 flights a day specifically targeting enemy infantry, but they still can't keep up with the volume.
The enemy is successfully infiltrating and dispersing into houses and basements.

Prisoners who were interrogated in time said that fresh reserves had arrived, and they were sent to capture areas that were reported as "already captured," so the pressure is expected to continue in the coming days.

FRONT, ‘media by soldiers for soldiers’, October 24:

Russians have entered Selydove. There are fuck off many of them there; it will be interesting to hear what people have to say about this.

Muchnoy ✙ Jugend, October 24:

Pokrovsk direction: The fate of the city of Selydove is quite grim. The enemy continues advancing along the high points and raising their flags on buildings. The buildup of new enemy reserves is strongly felt, especially when you try to escape an encirclement from one street, only to find at least a platoon of enemy troops behind you, firing at you. If you're lucky, you might slip through; otherwise, it's either being carried off on a shield or getting captured.

Currently, the enemy controls about 85% of the city. Our troops are still holding certain areas, but soon everyone will need to withdraw as the enemy's numerical superiority is becoming overwhelming. The situation is similar to what happened in Novohrodivka.

Kurakhove

46th Brigade:

The Battle for Kurakhove

19/10/2024 6:48 PM
The loss of Maksymilianivka

During the battle for Maksymilianivka, the enemy used tactics that had proven effective in previous battles at Krasnohorivka. Initially, they advanced to the dismounting line using armored vehicles (n.p. Heorhiivka) and then attacked in small infantry groups, closing the distance for small arms combat.

Over the past few days, the enemy launched several such assaults, but without success. Afterward, they changed tactics. In conjunction with the actions of their assault groups in the settlement, they sent a mechanized column south of Maksymilianivka to envelop the area along the road to Kurakhove. This maneuver gave the occupiers certain advantages, and after suffering losses in equipment and personnel, the center of the village fell under enemy control. Considering the predominance of private housing in the western part of the settlement, that area effectively became a gray zone, which the occupiers began clearing.

The capture of Maksymilianivka will be actively used by the enemy to concentrate assault groups within the settlement and to conduct mechanized assaults on the eastern part of Kurakhove. However, the loss of the village has other consequences as well—the enemy may use it as a staging point to strike at the units defending south of Kurakhove (Katerinivka-Kostyantynopil). Afterward, they may attempt to enter Kurakhove from the south. Thus, alongside the "northern option" (https://t.me/odshbr46/1896), a "southern option" for storming the city is emerging.

22/10/2024 1:36 AM
Information update

Over the last few days, two interviews with servicemen from our brigade were released (links at the end of the post). Both were focused on the defense of Kurakhove and the situation within the brigades defending it.

The first interview was with Lieutenant V. Shevchenko, deputy company commander and owner of the Veterano Coffee café chain. The interview, released by IS, drew interesting comparisons between business processes and war [EIU - in it, he argues that his experience as a businessman has been useful to his role as a commander. He says that commanders should be careful about potential risks and losses, just like businessmen. He also discusses his NATO training, saying he didn’t learn much, but what he did learn was somewhat useful.]

The second interview involved servicemen from four brigades, including our own, and was given to the Spanish publication El Pais. This provided the most objective account of the situation. It described the state of affairs within the brigades, the challenges of conducting urban combat, the use of UAVs in city conditions, and the major issues with rotations and casualty replacement.

Both interviews share a common theme: all servicemen unanimously confirm earlier reports of personnel shortages. The first issue is that people do not want to go to the front. Not to the armed forces in general, but to the front lines specifically. Military enlistment offices can no longer meet recruitment targets, leading to multiple videos showing the use of force by these offices. This leads to the second problem— the rate of personnel arriving from the enlistment offices to the front is significantly lower than the rate of personnel losses due to deaths and injuries. In other words, if a brigade loses 50 people daily, for example, only 20 arrive from the recruitment centers (numbers are approximate). To stop the enemy and transition to at least positional defense, the rate of reserve arrivals must exceed the rate of personnel losses.

As a result, Russian forces now have the strategic initiative and are advancing. However, the pace of their operations indicates the opposite—reinforcements are arriving, allowing them to maintain offensive momentum since the beginning of this year.

Muchnoy ✙ Jugend, October 24:

🇺🇦 Pokrovsk direction: The enemy has captured Izmailivka and is gradually moving towards Novoselydivka, where they have already occupied the western part of the village! This indicates that the enemy may now break through to the rear, south of Hirnyk and Kurakhivka. In Selydove, we have lost control of the eastern, southern, and central parts of the city, with only the western and northern parts remaining under our control. There is still one road left, which we urgently need to withdraw through, as the situation is shaping up to be quite bad.

🌚 And I believe that this initiative must be taken advantage of immediately!