Tectonic shifts are underway in the drone war. Russia is deploying more and more of its own ‘Rassvet’ satellites into the atmosphere. The spectre of a Russian alternative to Starlink haunts the west.
March 23 Soyuz-2.1b launch, successfully placing a batch of 16 Rassvet satellites into orbit.
There are already two hours a day when Russian drones could connect to Rassvet and conduct strikes on Ukraine without fear of jamming. Ukrainian analysts fear that at current rates, Russia could achieve 24/7 connection by mid-2027.
In turn, Ukraine has been trying to strike Russian space communications centres. But so far, with little lucky. And Ukrainian analysts admit that even if these stations were destroyed, the satellites would continue working through other means.
Another significant problem is the increased deployment of specialized Russian electronic warfare systems capable of jamming Ukrainian drones using Starlink. This was once considered impossible. Ukrainian military personnel fear that the removal of Starlink access for the Russians at the start of 2026 made the Ukrainian side too complacent, which is now reaping the corresponding rewards.
Finally, Russia continues to develop its long-range Geran (Shahed) drones. At the moment, the old fleet of slower Geran models is being replaced with new, jet-powered version featuring autonomous targeting capabilities. The engines put them out of range of interceptor drones, and the autonomous targeting capabilities mean that they can’t be jammed once they identify a target.
But first, a new look at just how (in)effective Ukraine’s long-range drone strikes on Russia have been.
We had a look yesterday at the 2% effectiveness of Ukrainian long-range drone strikes yesterday. And just today, the popular Ukrainian military analyst DroneBomber released his own calculation:
We parsed the main Russian monitoring channels tracking drone shoot-downs in Moscow and the Moscow region. We logged around 1,500 reported interceptions.
To put the scale into perspective: In July alone, according to Sobyanin, 6,225 drones flew toward the Moscow region. Of those, 780 were shot down on the near approaches to Moscow.
🔴Map 1 — shoot-downs only.
🔴Map 2 — the locations of Moscow and Moscow region air defense systems.
🔴Map 3 — the two overlaid.
Now for the results of our sample. To put it mildly, they’re disappointing:
🔴~1,400 drones (≈93%) were shot down at the 1st and 2nd air defense lines in the region. 🔴~100 drones (≈6%) were shot down within the 3rd defense line (the MKAD ring). 🔴Within Moscow itself — a grand total of 1 (0.07%). One. A single drone.
And what about actual targets hit over the past two months?
Here’s almost the entire list: 🟢The Dubna Space Communications Center 🟢Wildberries warehouses and logistics hubs 🟢Oil storage depots 🟢The Kapotnya oil refinery (several times in June) 🟢A couple of industrial zones and residential buildings hit by debris
That’s it.
Against the backdrop of thousands of launches, this isn’t even a drop in the bucket. It’s almost laughable.
If the tactic was to “draw out all the air defense missiles in this area,” it has failed. They appear to be in good shape, they have sufficient stocks, and the air defense ring is functioning effectively. If the goal was to identify routes for a breakthrough, the maps show they tried from every direction. There are no open corridors.
Draw your own conclusions about whether that’s acceptable or not.
Here we can have a look at Ukraine’s FP-1 drone, the most commonly-used long range UAV. As you can tell from its general appearance, this isn’t exactly the fastest or most agile creature.
Rassvet
Meanwhile, Russia’s program to create its own analogue to Starlink is enjoying progress. This presents a truly strategic challenge to Ukraine, and western military power more broadly.
Continue reading this post for free, courtesy of Events in Ukraine.
